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Value Added Tax
I. INTRODUCTION
When the people are weary of any one sort of Tax, presently some
Projector propounds another, and gets himself Audience, by af-
firming he can propound a way how all the Publick charge may be
born without the way that is.
Sir William Petty, A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions (1679)
Recent history has been marked by public discontent with the
federal tax system and its allocation of the tax burden. This has
prompted suggestions that Congress reduce its reliance on income
and payroll taxes. One such suggestion is to shift some of the bur-
den from an income tax to a consumption tax like a value added
tax ("VAT").
In May, 1985, President Reagan submitted to Congress a Trea-
sury proposal, in modified form, to broaden the bases and reduce
the rates for the corporate and individual income taxes.' In this
proposal, Treasury, restricted to revenue-neutral options,2 declined
to use this opportunity to replace part of the existing income tax
with a VAT. Congress enacted a base broadening, rate reducing
reform in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "1986 Act"),3 but left
the federal budget in a chronic deficit.4
This article will examine the philosophical support for a VAT,
and the validity of its potential application to the American tax
system. VAT is a multistage tax imposed on the "value added" to
goods as they proceed through stages of production and distribu-
tion and to services as they are rendered. The prevalent view is
that VAT is usually passed on to consumers in the form of in-
creased prices, not borne by business. Thus, with a VAT, a govern-
' The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity
(1985) [hereinafter The President's Proposal]; see also U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Tax Re-
form for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to
the President (1984) (three volume report that provided the basis for the President's pro-
posed tax reforms) [hereinafter Treasury Proposal].
2 See The President's Proposal, supra note 1, at 5 (notes that reforms are revenue-neutral
plus or minus 1.5% of total revenues).
a In the 1986 Act, Congress capped the individual income tax rate at 28%, see Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096-99 (codified at I.R.C. § 1),
and the corporate income tax rate at 34%, see Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 601, 100 Stat. at 2249 (codified at I.R.C. § 11).
' The chronic nature of the deficit has generated serious concern among investors about
the health of the American economy. See Murray, Stock Market's Frenzy Puts Fed's Green-
span in a Crucial Position, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1987, at § 1, col. 6.
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ment shifts its emphasis from taxing income, which represents the
potential to consume, to taxing the actual consumption of goods
and services.
The article concludes that although a VAT could provide the
federal government with a powerful tool to raise additional reve-
nue, including revenue from the charitable-governmental sectors of
the economy and provide a more efficient means of taxing goods
and services; a VAT would not fare well on equity, economic, and
administrative grounds. Despite the 1986 reforms which signifi-
cantly flattened the tax rates, the federal tax system still taxes in-
dividuals on an "ability to pay" principle. A VAT is regressive
under this principle in that lower income taxpayers will bear the
heaviest tax burden when such burden is measured as a percentage
of income. Also, it is not clear that a VAT would have any positive
long-term effect on the economy. Finally, the enactment of a VAT
and its continued maintenance will impose significant administra-
tive costs on the government and compliance costs on taxpayers.
Thus, viewed under the parameters of the current tax system, a
VAT is not appealing, but if there is a further shift in taxpayers'
attitudes towards a progressive tax system, and what is fair, or
there is a need for significantly more federal revenue than Con-
gress could raise under existing taxes, Congress may enact a VAT.
In reaching this conclusion, the article will engage in an exten-
sive analysis of consumption taxes and the existing federal tax sys-
tem. Part II examines the current federal tax structure. Part III
provides the basic ideology behind consumption taxes and prior
governmental efforts to enact a VAT. Part IV describes the differ-
ent variants of VATs and details their mechanics. Part V explains
the structural reasons that justify a reexamination of the tax sys-
tem and analyzes how the VAT fits into that system.
II. EXISTING FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE
A. National and International Perspective
The tax burden may be allocated among income, consumption,
and wealth.' Taxes levied on any of these tax bases may be classi-
fied as: (1) direct personal taxes, or (2) indirect or ad rem taxes.
" See Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale L.J.
1081, 1084 (1980).
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Direct taxes are imposed on the party expected to bear them. In
contrast, indirect taxes generally are collected and remitted to the
government by one not expected to bear the tax burden.' For this
purpose, the individual income tax, the employee's share of payroll
taxes, and the wealth transfer (estate and gift) taxes are classified
as direct personal taxes. The corporate income tax, the employer's
share of payroll taxes, the sales and excise taxes, and the property
taxes are classified as indirect or ad rem taxes.
Table 1 shows that the federal government relies much more
heavily on direct personal taxes than state and local governments
do. The federal government derived fifty-eight percent of its reve-
nue from personal taxes, levied almost exclusively on an income
base. In contrast, state and local governments derived only 11.6%
of their revenue from direct taxes on income and wealth and over
eighty-eight percent from ad rem taxes levied on income, consump-
tion and wealth bases. Combining all levels of government, the
United States raises about forty percent of its revenue from direct
taxes and sixty percent from ad rem taxes.
' See Kahn, The Place of Consumption and Net Worth Taxation in the Federal Tax
Structure, in Broad-Based Taxes: New Options and Sources 133 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973).
7 Over a decade earlier, the relative reliance by these levels of government on personal
and ad rem taxes was about the same. See Kahn, supra note 6, at 133-37.
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TABLE 1"
Taxes by Type of Tax Base and Level of Government, 1981-1982"*
(in billions $)
Federal State & Local All Levels
Personal Ad Rem Total Personal Ad Rem Total Personal Ad Rem Total
49.2
94.9 94.9
393.0 144.1 537.1
140.7
140.7 140.7
50.8
15.0
56.1
50.8 71.1 121.9
192.1
252.7 252.7
81.9
Income
Indiv.
Corp.
Payroll***
Total
Consump.
Sales
Others
Total
Wealth
Prop.
Estate &
Gift
Total
10.4
81.9 84.3 10.4
TOTALS 401.0 284.8 685.8 53.2 405.7 458.9 454.2 690.5 1144.7
% of TOTALS
(by group) 58.5 41.5 100.0 11.6 88.4 100.0 39.7 60.3 100.0
* The format for this table was taken from Kahn, The Place of Consumption and Net Worth in the
Federal Tax Structure, in Broad-Based Taxes: New Options and Sources 133, Table 2 (R. Musgrave ed.
1973).
** Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Governmental Finances in 1981-82 17, Table 2 &
19, Table 4 (1983).
- The federal payroll taxes arbitrarily were divided equally between employees (personal) and em-
ployers (ad rem), though there is economic data indicating that, in the long term, the employer's share
may be shifted back onto labor in the form of reduced wages. Assuming full backward shifting, the totals
for all levels of government would be $549.1 billion (48%) personal and $595.6 billion (52%) ad rem.
Table 2 measures selected industrialized nations' tax burdens as
a percentage of the nations' gross domestic products (GDP).'
' The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) compares taxes
of member nations based on GDP. The United States, on the other hand, relies on gross
national product (GNP). GNP equals GDP "plus the Income accruing to domestic residents
arising from Investment abroad less Income earned in the domestic market accruing to for-
eigners abroad." D. Auld, G. Bannock, D. Baxter & R. Rees, The American Dictionary of
Economics G131 (1983).
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Tax Type
2.4
8.0 2.4
348.9
64.2
94.9 151.0
443.8 215.2
81.9
81.9 92.3
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TABLE 2
1982 TAXES (AS % OF GDP)
COMPARED WITH 1960 DATA
1982 * 1960 Compared** % Increase
Sweden 50.3 27.2 85
Netherlands 45.5 30.1 51
France 43.7 - -
United Kingdom 39.6 28.5 39
Germany 37.3 31.3 19
Canada 34.9 24.2 44
United States 30.5 26.6 15
Japan 27.2 18.2 49
* Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, Revenue Statistics of (OECD) Member Countries 1965-
1983 84, Table 1.
•* Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, Long-term Trends in Tax Revenues of OECD Member
Countries 1955-1980, OECD Studies in Taxation 11, Table 1
(1981). The French figures were not available.
Except for Japan, in 1982, the United States took a smaller per-
centage of its GDP in taxes than all of the compared countries.
Also, of those compared, between 1960 and 1982, the public sector
in the United States expanded the least."
Table 3 below graphically presents the relative importance of
each major form of tax in the nations' tax structures. Property
taxes occupy a minimal role in most of the compared European
countries, but are more important (although still modest) in Eng-
land, Canada, the United States and Japan. Also, taxes on goods
and services (consumption taxes) are much less important in the
United States and Japan than they are in the other nations. Fi-
nally, France's individual income tax is startlingly low, Japan's cor-
porate income tax is quite high, and Canada's payroll taxes ac-
count for a small proportion of its total taxes.
' As a percentage of GNP, the growth in taxes has been concentrated in payroll taxes. See
infra p. 216, Table 5.
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TABLE 3
1982 TAXES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TAX*
Individual Corp. Goods &
Income Income Payroll Property Services
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Sweden 40.79 3.34 30.48 1.01 24.21
Netherlands 23.92 6.79 41.62 3.60 23.79
France 12.87 5.08 45.38 3.69 29.66
United Kingdom 28.40 9.56 20.26 12.72 28.97
Germany 29.89 5.11 36.18 3.26 26.52
Canada 35.02 6.01 11.27 9.02 34.60
United States 37.80 6.96 27.71 10.07 17.45
Japan 25.29 19.72 30.37 8.94 15.42
* Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1983 87, Table 7;
89, Table 11 & 90, Table 13 (1984). Due to miscellaneous items, the total
percentage for each nation may not total 100%.
To generalize from Table 3, the United States and Japan place
considerable emphasis on taxing income from labor and capital at
its source (individual and corporate income taxes, as well as pay-
roll and property taxes) and quite little on taxing the use of in-
come and savings for consumption of goods and services. Japan re-
lies more on corporate and less on the individual income tax than
does the United States. France relies more heavily on payroll and
consumption taxes than on income taxes. Sweden heavily taxes
both individuals' income from labor (personal income and payroll
taxes) and individuals' use of their income or capital on consump-
tion (taxes on goods and services). While Sweden taxes returns on
capital (dividends, rent and interest) under its individual income
tax, it does not heavily tax capital under the corporate income tax
or wealth under the property tax.
Viewed from an international perspective, it is not apparent that
the United States should substantially alter its existing array of
taxes. Our overall federal, state and local tax burden is not out of
line in relation to other industrialized countries.
B. The Federal Tax System
1. Introduction
There currently are five general groupings into which federal
Value Added Tax
taxes can be placed-individual income tax, corporate income tax,
payroll taxes (predominantly social security taxes), wealth transfer
(estate and gift) taxes, and selective excise taxes and customs du-
ties. The income and payroll tax liabilities depend upon the nature
of the taxpayers' receipts. Thus, receipts from wages and returns
on investments are included in the income base, but not receipts
from gifts, inheritance, or government welfare and similar pro-
grams. Receipts from covered wages are subject to payroll taxes,
but not returns on investments. In contrast, excise tax liability de-
pends upon the use of funds for the acquisition of taxable goods
and services, not the source of the funds. For example, air travel
may be taxed, whether the ticket is purchased with funds from
savings or from current wage income.
Since 1960, as Table 4 demonstrates, the federal government has
maintained its traditional reliance on income-based taxes,'0 but
dramatically altered the balance among these taxes. It doubled the
payroll taxes and cut corporate income tax from about twenty-
three percent to eight percent of total revenue. In addition, start-
ing in 1981, Congress moved the individual and corporate income
taxes closer to consumption-based taxes. It encouraged savings by
liberalizing deductions for individual contributions into retirement
plans" and encouraged investment in capital goods with liberal-
ized depreciation deductions provided by the Accelerated Cost Re-
covery System.'2 As part of the base-broadening, rate reducing re-
forms in 1986, Congress reversed some of the movement toward
consumption-style income taxes.' 3
o See Kahn, supra note 6, at 136, Table 3.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 219.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 168.
'3 See supra note 3.
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TABLE 4
TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET RECEIPTS*
1982 1960
(%) (%)
Individual income tax 48.2 44.0
Corporate income tax 8.0 23.2
Payroll taxes 32.6 15.9
Estate & gift taxes 1.3 1.7
Excise & other taxes 9.9 15.2
100.0 100.0
*Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables: Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1987, Tables 2.1 & 2.5.
While Table 4 illustrates the relative importance of each tax in
the federal tax structure, it does not reflect the magnitude of the
tax as a percentage of the standard measure of economic activity,
the gross national product (GNP). 4 Table 3 provides this perspec-
tive. It shows that total taxes, as a percentage of GNP, increased
only two percent over this period. While personal income and pay-
roll taxes increased from almost eleven percent to 16.3 % of GNP,
this increase was offset by a decline in corporate taxes of 2.6 % of
GNP.
TABLE 5*
FEDERAL TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP 15
1982 1960
(%) (%)
Individual income tax 9.7 8.0
Corporate income tax 1.6 4.2
Payroll taxes 6.6 2.9
Estate & gift taxes .3 .3
Excise & other taxes 2.0 2.8
20.2 18.2
*Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables: Budget of
the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1987, Table 1.2.
' Over a period of time, measuring each tax by the standard GNP yardstick removes
some of the distorting effect inflation may have on the total dollar revenue raised by each
tax.
" The GNP was $507.7 billion in 1960 and $3,141.5 billion in 1982. See Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year
Value Added Tax
Thus, if the United States needs substantially more revenue
than is within the tax base of existing federal taxes, the existing
revenue could be raised from the existing income-based taxes or a
new tax. The question is whether there are economic or other tax
policy reasons for raising the revenue from a VAT rather than ex-
isting federal taxes.
2. Individual Income Tax
The individual income tax is the primary federal revenue source,
accounting in 1982 for $297.7 billion in revenue or 48.2% of federal
budget receipts 6 and 9.7% of GNP.'7 Income from labor accounts
for a dramatic 84.2% of the individual income tax base."' As with
most of the major federal taxes, the individual income tax is col-
lected at the source of the income. For most individuals, the in-
come tax on the eighty-four percent labor component of the base is
withheld from wages and paid to the government by the taxpayer's
employer. Self-employed individuals and those not within the
withholding system pay their tax on income from labor through
estimated tax payments or at the time their personal returns are
filed. Tax on the remaining sixteen percent of the tax base is col-
lected from the earners of the income (or, for estates and trusts,
the entities) through estimated tax payments or payment accom-
1987, Table 1.2 (1986) [hereinafter Historical Tables].
"0 Historical Tables, supra note 15, at Table 2.1.
7 See supra p. 216, Table 5.
18 See Internal Revenue Service, 1982 Statistics of Income-Individual, Individual Income
Tax Returns 2, Table A (1984). The breakdown of the individual income tax burden is
presented in the following table:
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panying the filing of the return. 9 Whether initially withheld from
wages or paid directly by the taxpayer, most of the individual in-
come tax ultimately is borne by the individual earning the
income. 0
3. Payroll Taxes
The dramatic increases in social security taxes and benefits since
1977 have made payroll taxes the second largest federal revenue
Table A
1982 Individual Income
Tax Base
(in millions $) (%)
Income from Labor
Salaries & wages 1,564,995 84.50
Pensions & annuities* 60,123 3.25
Statutory adjustments (64,887) (3.50)
Total income from labor 1,560,231 84.25
Income from Capital
Professional & other
businesses, including
farms, estates & trusts 46,906 2.53**
Sale of assets 35,018 1.89
Interest & dividends in
adjusted gross income 209,164 11.29
Rent (8,478) (0.46)
Royalty 6,319 0.34
Total income from capital 288,929 15.59
Other (including unemployment compensation,
a--imony & state income tax refunds) 2,976 0.16
Total Adjusted Gross Income (less Deficit) 1,852,136 100.00
* If annuity income represents the return on a capital investment, it properly should be
classified as Income from Capital. To the extent that it represents payment of wages de-
ferred to retirement, it should be classified as Income from Labor. The above statistical data
does not separate pension and annuity income.
** Part of the income from professional and other businesses may constitute income from
labor of the owners, but if it is not distributed as salary, it is classified as Income from
Capital.
'" See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 302(a), 96
Stat. 324, 585-86 (as amended by Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354,
§ 1361, 96 Stat. 1669, 1669 and Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 101,
96 Stat. 2365, 2365-67). However, Congress repealed the withholding requirement it imposed
on interest and dividends before it became effective. See Interest and Dividend Tax Compli-
ance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 102(a), 97 Stat. 369, 369.
'0 For an estate or trust, the tax is borne by the beneficiaries. In addition, sole proprietors
and partners may, to some extent, try to shift part of their income tax to their customers in
the form of higher prices for their products or services.
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source. In 1982, payroll taxes totalled $ 201.5 billion, which was
32.6% of federal budget receipts and 6.6% of GNP.2
Payroll taxes are imposed on only one factor of production, com-
pensation. However, their bases are narrower than the eighty-four
percent labor component in the individual income tax base. Some
employers, such as some units of government, were excluded and
later grandfathered out of the social security system.2 2 Some em-
ployers are not subject to the federal unemployment compensation
tax on their workers' wages. Even for covered workers, the social
security and unemployment compensation tax bases are capped at
specified amounts of taxable wages per employee. Salary and
wages above the statutory caps are exempt from these taxes.2 3
Consequently, there is a significant gap between wages subject to
payroll taxes and wages subject to the individual income tax.
The employees' contributions to the social security trust funds
are withheld at the source of wage income. The employers' contri-
butions for social security as well as their liability for federal un-
employment taxes are imposed as wages are paid. Self-employed
individuals use the self-assessment system to report and pay their
social security tax liability. While in the short-term, the employers
bear their share of the payroll taxes contributed into the social se-
curity trust fund, in the long term, it is likely that most or all of
the employers' contributions are borne by labor in the form of re-
24duced wages.
21 See Historical Tables, supra note 15, at Table 2.1.
22 Section 101 of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 provided that newly-hired fed-
eral employees would be covered by the social security system, not the government employ-
ees retirement program. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 101,
97 Stat. 65, 65.
3 See Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)(1)-I (defining the method of calculating the statutory cap
on payroll taxes); see also 1 Fed. Tax Guide Rep. (CCH) § 113 (listing the statutory cap at
$42,00 for 1986 and $43,800 for 1987).
24 See J.Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 215-17 (1983). There is some empirical work sug-
gesting that the employer's share of the payroll tax may not be fully shifted back to the
employees. See Hamermesh, New Estimates of the Incidence of the Payroll Tax, 45 So.
Econ. J. 1208 (1979). But cf. Moore, Self-Employment and the Incidence of the Payroll Tax,
36 Nat'l Tax J. 491, 499 (1983) (maintaining that wage and salary workers earnings are
reduced substantially due to the employer contribution of the payroll tax). If not borne by
labor, the employer's share of social security taxes will be shifted forward and be borne by
consumers. See P. Musgrave & R. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 412
(1976).
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4. Corporate Income Tax
In 1982, the corporate income tax ranked third in importance as
a federal revenue source. 25 It raised $49.2 billion in revenue, ac-
counting for eight percent of federal budget receipts and 1.6% of
GNP. 26 To compute corporate taxable income, the Internal Reve-
nue Code allows corporations to take deductions for reasonable
compensation, interest and rent expenses, thus limiting the tax
base to only one of the economic factors of production, profit.
2 7
The tax is imposed on and paid by the corporation and generally
will be borne by its shareholders." However, it is likely that some
profitable corporations are able to shift this tax burden to consum-
ers in the form of higher prices for their goods and services.29
5. Excise Taxes
The federal government imposes (1) customs duties on imports,
and (2) excise taxes on selected products and services.3 0 In 1945,
excise taxes accounted for 13.92% of total receipts. 31 They re-
mained in that general range through the mid-1950s. While high-
way user fees were instituted in 1957 and other trust funds were
established in the 1970s, excise tax revenue remained fairly sta-
ble. 32 Thus, as total revenue increased, excises declined as a per-
25 As a group, excises and other miscellaneous taxes (not including estate and gift taxes)
accounted for more revenue than the corporate income tax. However, excluding earnings by
the Federal Reserve System from federal reserve deposits, excise and other taxes fell below
the corporate income tax revenue.
26 See supra p. 216, Table 4 & p. 216, Table 5; see also Historical Tables, supra note 15, at
Tables 2.1 & 2.2.
17 If depreciation for tax purposes exceeds the economic decline in the value of tangible
productive assets, then corporate taxable income would not be equivalent to corporate eco-
nomic profits.
" But see Brannon, Fairness and Unfairness in the Tax System (Part II), 5 Tax Notes 23
(Nov. 28, 1977); Brannon, Fairness and Unfairness in the Tax System (Part I), 5 Tax Notes
3 (Nov. 21, 1977) (both articles are reprints of chapters of an unpublished book by Gerard
Brannon on tax reform. See G. Brannon, Tax Reform: Justice, Efficiency and Politics (un-
published manuscript)). Nevertheless, it is likely that in some industries, especially regu-
lated industries, the corporation can shift at least part of the corporate tax forward into the
price of its products or services.
" See infra text accompanying note 167.
30 Congress imposed a windfall profits tax on selected producers that extract and sell
domestically produced crude oil. See Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-223, 94 Stat. 229. This tax is scheduled to be phased out by 1990. See I.R.C. § 4990.
31 Historical Tables, supra note 15, at Table 2.1.
32 Id.
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centage of receipts. By 1979, they represented only four percent of
total receipts. They rose to 6.8% in 1981, the peak revenue year for
the crude oil windfall profits tax.3
In 1982, custom duties were $8.85 billion and excises and other
miscellaneous taxes, not including estate and gift taxes, were
$52.47 billion. Combined, for 1982, they accounted for $61.32 bil-
lion or 9.9% of federal budget receipts and two percent of GNP. 4
Most federal excise taxes are expected to be shifted to consum-
ers as part of the prices for taxed goods and services.35 To the ex-
tent that the windfall profits taxes are paid by business and other
excises, such as airport and airway taxes on business travel, are
paid on business purchases, they tend to be incorporated into the
prices of those businesses' goods and services and ultimately are
borne by the consumers of those items.3"
6. Wealth Transfer (Estate and Gift) Taxes
Estate and gift taxes are transactional taxes, not annual levies,
imposed on the transfer of property (wealth) by gift, devise or be-
quest. In 1982, estate and gift tax receipts totaled $8 billion, ac-
counting for 1.3% of receipts (down slightly from 1.7% in 1960)
and 0.3% of the GNP. 7
C. Summary
The burden of most federal taxes is on individuals directly.
Taxes on income from labor-payroll taxes and most of the indi-
vidual income tax base-is borne in whole or in substantial part by
those performing the labor services. Profits of unincorporated
businesses are taxed under the individual income tax and, except
33 Id.
" See supra p. 216, Tables 4 & p. 216, Table 5; see also Historical Tables, supra note 15,
at Tables 2.1, 2.4, & 2.5.
35 See J. Pechman, supra note 24, at 185-193. The major excise taxes include alcohol and
tobacco taxes and the windfall profits tax. On the latter, see supra note 30. Other excise
taxes include trust funds for highway, airport and airway, black lung disability, inland wa-
terway, hazardous substances, and aquatic resources. See Historical Tables, supra note 15,
at Table 2.4.
" See P. Musgrave & R. Musgrave, supra note 24, at 399.
" See supra p. 216, Table 4 & p. 216, Table 5; see also Historical Tables, supra note 15, at
Tables 2.1 & 2.5.
" In the long term, even the employer's share of payroll taxes probably is borne by labor.
See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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for those able to shift this income tax forward into the prices of
proprietors' goods and services, tax on this profit likely is borne by
the owners of such businesses.3 9 Returns on capital owned by indi-
viduals, estates and trusts (dividends, rent and interest) are borne
by the owners under the individual income tax. Estate and gift
taxes are paid and borne by those who transfer wealth inter vivos
or on death. Finally, corporate profits are subject to the corpora-
tion income tax. While economists debate whether the corpor-
ate tax is borne by shareholders, is shifted forward to consumers in
the form of higher prices, or is absorbed by labor through reduced
wage rates, it will be assumed, as most economists assume, that for
purposes of making tax policy decisions, the tax is borne by
shareholders.4
Businesses collect and remit sales, excise or other taxes that are
ultimately borne by consumers. In contrast to income and payroll
taxes imposed at the point income is earned, these consumption
taxes are imposed at the point the consumer uses income or sav-
ings to acquire taxed items. 1 These indirect taxes represent a
small portion of the federal tax system, but would increase signifi-
cantly with the adoption of a broad-based consumption tax.
III. TRANSACTION FORMS OF CONSUMPTION TAX
Congress could increase revenue from consumption taxes by rais-
ing the rates or by expanding the base of federal excise taxes. For
example, it could increase alcohol and tobacco tax rates, add more
user fees for government services, or tax additional services.
Rather than using the shotgun approach of excise taxes, Congress
could adopt a broad-based tax on many or most goods and services
acquired for personal consumption. As a tax imposed at a single
stage, this broad-based tax could be imposed at the manufactur-
ing4 2 or wholesale level, or like the state retail sales taxes, it could
" Business profits of estates and trusts are taxed under the Code. See I.R.C. § 1(e).
40 See Break, The Incidence and Economic Effects of Taxation, in The Economics of
Public Finance 138-54 (A. Binder ed. 1974) (presenting the different views as to who actu-
ally shares the cost of the corporate income tax).
"' Even if components, capital goods or finished goods or.services are nominally taxed to
manufacturers or intermediaries in the production-distribution chain, the tax likely will be
considered part of the cost of providing the final goods or services and will be reflected in
the prices charged final consumers.
2 For example, Congress proposed to fund the "Superfund" hazardous waste program
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be limited to the retail stage.'3 Finally, Congress could enact a
broad-based, multistage tax like the European-inspired VAT."
A. The Philosophy Behind Consumption Taxes
Some of the philosophical underpinnings of consumption taxes
come from the writings of Thomas Hobbes, as expanded by
Nicholas Kaldor. According to Hobbes, persons should pay tax
based on what they withdraw from society's limited resources
(measured by consumption) rather than what they contribute to
such resources (measured by income).' 5 Hobbes' philosophy was
incorporated by Kaldor into a broader defense of the consumption
base for progressive individual taxation. 6
A consumption based tax is particularly justified if there is such
a scarcity of resources that excessive consumption will inhibit eco-
nomic growth or will divert resources from more socially-desirable
uses such as education.' 7 With select excise taxes imposed on spe-
with a broad-based tax on corporations, a form of tax on value added by taxed corporations.
See H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. H1941 (daily ed. April 4, 1985).
" Generally, it is assumed that a multistage VAT and a single stage retail sales tax raise
the same amount of revenue, assuming that they have the same tax base. However, when
Louisiana, over 20 years ago, extended its retail sales tax up to the wholesale level, making
retailers subject to tax only on value they added, the sales tax revenue increased beyond the
amount expected, based on economic growth. See J. Due & J. Mikesell, Sales Taxation:
State and Local Structure and Administration 47 (1983). Apparently, by extending the re-
tail tax up to the wholesale stage, the retailers were more diligent in reporting all of their
retail sales and sales by wholesalers directly to consumers were taxed.
" Before converting to the VAT, European countries relied on a turnover tax imposed on
taxable items as they turned over at each stage of production and distribution. See infra
notes 86-87 and accompanying text. This tax had a cascade effect and encouraged the verti-
cal integration of firms. Id. This article therefore eliminates turnover tax from consideration
as a possible multistage form of sales tax.
4" According to Hobbes, "What reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and spar-
ing the fruits of his labor, consumeth little, should be charged more, than he that living
idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets: Seeing that one hath no more protection from
the commonwealth than the other?" T. Hobbes, Leviathan 184 (Dutton ed. 1914).
46 See N. Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax 11, 53 (1965); see also Andrews, A Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974) (arguing for a con-
sumption tax) [hereinafter Consumption-Type or Cash Flow]. Professor Andrews' article,
which relies on Kaldor, became the leading work in the academic debate over consumption
taxes. See Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren,
88 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (1975), Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption-Tax, 92
Harv. L. Rev. 1575 (1979) (both arguing for a consumption tax). But see Warren, Jr., Fair-
ness and a Consumption Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax , 88 Harv. L. Rev. 931
(1975).
" See Kahn, supra note 6, at 137. According to Kaldor, "[i]t is only by spending, not by
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cific items of consumption, and with income tax deductions
granted for specific consumption expenditures such as medical
care and charitable contributions, Congress already relies on the
tax laws to allocate or control the level of consumption of various
categories of goods and services. 8 Even if there is no scarcity, con-
sumption advocates argue that the tax burden should be allocated
among individuals on the basis of benefits that they derive from
government services, and these benefits relate more directly to in-
dividuals' levels of consumption than their levels of income."9
Income and consumption can be viewed merely as measures of
different aspects of a broad concept of consumption, with income
representing the potential power to consume and consumption rep-
resenting the exercise of that power by actual purchases of goods
and services. Indeed, a flat rate individual income tax could be
constructed to resemble an income-style VAT base. Assuming that
a comparable tax base could be constructed,5" there would be some
differences in the timing of tax liability. Under the individual in-
come tax, income is taxed directly to those receiving factor in-
comes (wages, profit, interest, and rent). In contrast, under an in-
voice method, income-style VAT, the same factor incomes are
taxed in increments as value is added to products and services,51
but the tax liability does not attach until the goods are sold or the
services are rendered.
earning or saving, that an individual imposes a burden on the rest of the community in
attaining his own ends." See N. Kaldor supra note 46, at 53.
4' For examples of excise taxation of items of consumption, see I.R.C. §§ 4071 (tires and
tubes), 4661 (chemicals). The deductions for medical care and charitable contributions can
be found in § 170 and § 213 of the Code. See I.R.C. §§ 170 (charitable contributions), 213
(medical care).
" Some commentators have suggested that governments should increase their reliance on
the benefit 'principle by adding user fees for more government services. See R. Bird, Charg-
ing for Public Services: A New Look at an Old Idea (1976). But cf. Pechman, Tax Policies
for the 1980s, 11 Tax Notes 1195, 1200 (Dec. 22, 1980) (arguing that income is preferable to
consumption as a base for taxation, not only because it is a better measure of an individual's
ability to pay taxes, but also because it is widely approved).
50 It would be extremely unlikely that a comparable tax base could be constructed. With
an invoice method, income-style VAT, payments of taxes and charitable contributions
would be included in the tax base. In view of a history of exempting charities and units of
government from income tax on returns from capital (dividends, rents and interest), except
for the unrelated business income concept in § 511, see I.R.C. § 511, it would be very diffi-
cult to start taxing these sectors on income at this point.
" McLure, Jr., Economic Effects of Taxing Value Added, in Broad-Based Taxes: New
Options and Sources, supra note 6, at 157-58.
[Vol. 7:207
Value Added Tax
B. Prior Federal Efforts to Enact a Consumption Tax
There have been proposals to reduce federal reliance on income-
based taxes and, in the process, increase consumption-based taxes.
In 1977, the Treasury issued its "Blueprints for Basic Tax Re-
form," 5  analyzing a possible shift from our existing progressive in-
dividual income tax to a progressive consumption tax.
Congress has also toyed with proposals for a transactions form of
federal consumption tax. In 1979, and again in a modified form in
1980, then House Ways and Means Chairman Al Ullman proposed
a restructuring of our federal tax system by using revenue from a
new European-inspired value added tax (national sales tax) to fi-
nance cuts in income and social security taxes. 3 Finally, in 1985,
Senator Roth, a member of the Senate Finance Committee, pro-
posed a VAT in the form of a Business Transfer Tax ("BTT"),
designed to finance reductions in income and payroll taxes.54 How-
ever, his proposal did not receive a full review in Congress.
Still, in the early 1980s, Congress moved the individual and cor-
porate income taxes closer to consumption-based taxes by ex-
panding tax preferences for individual savings and by granting lib-
eral depreciation deductions for business acquisitions of capital
goods. With the 1986 tax reforms, Congress reversed this trend. It
curtailed both the deductions for payments into individual retire-
ment accounts and the accelerated depreciation on capital goods,55
and it repealed the investment tax credit available on purchases of
capital goods.5 6
IV. VALUE ADDED TAX
A. In General
A VAT is a multistage tax imposed on the "value added" to
52 U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 9-12 (1977).
53 See H.R. 7015, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. 7481, 7483-85 (1980) (outlining the
VAT portion of the bill) [hereinafter House Bill].
" See S. 1102, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S5675 (daily ed. May 8, 1985) [here-
inafter Senate Bill]. On February 20, 1986, Senator Roth modified his proposed Business
Transfer Tax (BTT). Except for Senator Roth's unusual provision providing a business with
a credit against the employer's share of FICA taxes for its BTT liability, the proposed BTT
resembles a sales- of cost-subtractive VAT. W. Roth, Jr., Remarks to the National Press
Club (Feb. 20, 1986) (Copy on file).
I.R.C. §§ 168 (capital goods), 219(g) (Individual Retirement Accounts).
56 I.R.C. §49(a).
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goods as they proceed through the stages of production and distri-
bution and to services as they are rendered. The "value added"
consists of the four economic factors of production-wages, profit,
rent and interest. " Businesses usually pass on the cost of the VAT
to consumers in the form of increased prices of goods and services.
A VAT may be viewed as a tax on consumption or a tax on busi-
ness. The perception, if not the economic reality, may depend in
part on whether the tax liability, at each stage, is based on tax
charged on sales invoices (invoice method) or is based on periodic
totals for annual business accounts. The latter is described as a
sales- or cost-subtractive VAT if the base consists of sales and de-
ductible costs, and is described as an additive method VAT if the
base is the sum of wages, interest, rent, and a special computation
of profit. One view is that the VAT serves as a mechanism to col-
lect a tax on items of personal consumption included within the
tax base. Providers of goods and services collect and remit the tax
that they shift to consumers in the form of increased product or
service prices. As such and with the same tax base, the VAT will
raise the same revenue as an equivalent rate retail sales tax.58 An-
other view is that VAT may be used as a "benefit principle" tax
imposed on and borne by business as "a charge for the benefits of
governmental services which directly benefit business enter-
prises. . . . ,,59However, in either case, unless there is in effect a
system of administered prices or perfect competition, in the long
term, it is likely that a VAT will be borne by final consumers."
While the term "value added tax" can be used to describe a tax
imposed on the four economic factors of production, there are
many different forms of taxation that can be included within the
general concept of a VAT. The variations depend upon the method
of calculating the tax, the jurisdictional reach of the tax, the inclu-
sion or exclusion of the VAT itself from the tax base, and the
See Shoup, Theory and Background of Value-Added Tax, 1955 Proc. of 48th Ann.
Conf. on Tax'n 7.
68 See infra p. 242 (diagram outlining the VAT burden on taxpayers).
68 C. Sullivan, The Tax on Value Added 4 (1965). The benefit to business rationale is
based, in part, on the premise that government services reduce business costs. Id. at 38.
0 "The principles which assume nonshifted sales taxes other than a low-rate privilege tax
either involve the unrealistic assumption of perfect competition or imply that the system is
dominated by administered prices." Id. at 49. The incidence issue aside, the legislative deci-
sion to enact a VAT as a consumption versus a business benefit tax will affect rules provid-
ing for a transition to a VAT.
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treatment of purchases of capital goods.
B. Elements of a Value Added Tax
1. Methods of Computing VAT Liability
There are two basic methods by which business may be required
to compute its VAT base-the additive method or one of the sub-
tractive methods, which include the sales- or cost-subtraction VAT
and the invoice or credit method VAT. Theoretically, the same tax
base can be created under each method, but it is likely that the
choice of method will affect the ultimate tax base.
Under the additive method,"' the taxpayer, such as a wholesaler,
totals the economic factors of production-wages, certain interest
and rent expense, and profit 6"-that add value to its taxable goods
or services.6 3 For each tax period, the wholesaler computes its tax
liability by applying the tax rate to the total of these factors of
production. For example, if the wholesaler incurred $100,000 wage
expense, $10,000 in interest and rent expense, and earned a
$50,000 profit, the wholesaler's VAT base for the period would to-
tal $160,000. Assuming a ten percent VAT rate, its VAT liability
would be $16,000, computed as follows:
Wages $100,000
Profit $ 50,000
Interest & Rent Expense $ 10,000
Tax Base $160,000
10% VAT Rate .10
VAT Liability for Period $ 16,000
Under the additive method, the factors of production will be
taxed, whether the taxpayer shifts these expenses forward into the
"I For an example of an additive VAT, see Michigan Single Business Tax Act, Mich.
Comp. Laws §§ 208.1-.145 (1979); see also Schenk, The Michigan Single Business Tax: A
State Value Added Tax?, 8 Tax Notes 411 (April 9, 1979); Symposium on the Michigan
Single Business Tax Act, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1017-1213 (1976) (both critiquing the Michigan
tax).
82 These four factors "reflect the activity of the employees of the firm, the services ren-
dered by the individual creditors and lessors of the firm, and the reward to the firm's own-
ers. ... Shoup, supra note 57, at 7.
63 For a more detailed discussion of the additive method VAT, see Special Comm. on the
Value-Added Tax of the Section of Taxation, ABA, Evaluation of an Additive-Method
Value-Added Tax for Use in the United States, 30 Tax Law. 565 (1977).
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price of taxed items or absorbs some of these expenses in the form
of lower profit or reduced return on the owner's investment. Un-
like the credit method VAT, the additive method tax liability is
not deferred until the business sells its goods or services.
With the same tax base and tax rate, under a sales- or cost-sub-
traction method VAT, 4 assuming the wholesaler's sales were
$200,000 and its deductible purchases were $40,000, the whole-
saler's VAT liability for the period would be the same $16,000,
computed as follows:
Sales $ 200,000
Deductible purchases $ (40,000)
Tax Base $ 160,000
10% VAT Rate .10
VAT Liability for Period $ 16,000
The sales-subtractive VAT taxes the costs and expenses incurred
by business that are shifted forward in the prices of its goods and
services, and provides a deduction for the cost of defined
purchases. For example, to the extent that charitable contributions
and taxes are shifted into the price of taxable items and thereby
included as part of gross taxable receipts, these costs are included
in the sales-subtractive base. 5
The second subtractive method VAT is the European-style in-
voice method (or credit method) VAT."6 To make a valid compari-
son with the above examples, it again must be assumed that the
wholesaler's sales were $200,000 and its deductible purchases were
$40,000. The wholesaler's VAT liability for the period would total
" Taxes and contributions are included in the additive method base to the extent that
they are shifted in prices of goods and services and therefore reflected in higher profit. For
an example of the sales- or cost-subtractive method VAT, see the former Michigan Business
Receipts Tax, 1955 Mich. Pub. Acts 738, repealed by 67 Mich. Pub. Acts 572-73. See also C.
Sullivan, supra note 59, at 300-11 (reviewing the former Michigan tax law). The Michigan
tax, known in the state as the Business Activities Tax ("BAT") was enacted as a specific tax
on income. It was in effect in Michigan from 1955 to 1967. Since it was imposed on taxable
gross receipts less allowable deductions and attempted to tax only value added at each stage
of production and distribution, it loosely could be described as a sales- or cost-subtractive
VAT. For a brief discussion of BAT and a comparison between the BAT and Senator Roth's
BTT, see Schenk, The Business Transfer Tax: The Value Added by Subtraction, 30 Tax
Notes 351 (Jan. 27, 1986).
e' See Schenk, supra note 64, at 359-60.
See C. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 17-19.
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$16,000, computed as follows:
Tax on Sales - 10% rate applied to sales
of $200,000 $20,000
Tax on Purchases - 10% rate charged on
purchases of $40,000 $(4,000)
VAT Liability for Period $16,000
Before the European nations enacted VATs, most of them relied
on turnover taxes. 7 The turnover tax was levied on gross sales
each time the goods turned over. It therefore encouraged vertical
integration of operations to reduce the total tax burden on goods
that proceeded through multiple stages of production and distribu-
tion. 8 In contrast, the additive and subtractive methods of calcu-
lating VAT provide tax neutrality between the nonintegrated and
integrated firms by eliminating from the tax base the value added
that already was taxed at previous stages.
There are cash flow differences between the additive and the in-
voice method VATs. U nder the additive approach, a wholesaler
must finance the VAT component in the price of its purchases.
Thus, if the wholesaler purchased goods for $100,000 plus $10,000
VAT, its inventory cost would be $110,000. The $10,000 VAT
would not be recovered until the wholesaler resold these goods. If
it borrowed to finance the tax-inclusive $110,000 inventory cost, it
would bear the interest cost on the $10,000 VAT until it resold the
goods and repaid the loan. The VAT and the interest cost to fi-
nance the VAT would become part of the wholesaler's operating
costs and therefore could be expected to influence the selling price
for its goods. Under an invoice method VAT, assuming the whole-
saler paid the same $110,000 tax-inclusive price for inventory, in
its first VAT return after the purchase the wholesaler would re-
ceive a $10,000 credit against its VAT liability for the input tax on
these purchases. Thus, under the invoice method, the wholesaler
" See id. at 6-16.
Indeed, "[tihe competitive inequities and inefficiencies caused by the cumulative na-
ture of the general turnover tax were responsible for the first proposal for value-added taxa-
tion, that of Dr. Wilhelm von Siemens, a German businessman and governmental consult-
ant, who called his proposal the 'improved turnover tax' or the 'refined turnover tax.'" Id.
at 12 (footnote omitted). On the deficiencies inherent in turnover taxes, see id. at 11-15.
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would not have to finance the $10,000 VAT69 (except to the extent
that it must pay its supplier the VAT before it can claim credit for
the input tax), and the VAT therefore should not enter into the
wholesaler's resale price for its goods.
2. Jurisdictional Reach of the VAT
Depending upon its jurisdictional reach, a VAT can be struc-
tured as an origin or destination principle tax. A tax designed to
tax value added within the nation should be imposed on all value
that is added to goods and services within the territorial bounda-
ries of the taxing nation. An origin principle VAT, consistent with
this economic notion of value added, imposes tax on the value
added to goods and services within the taxing jurisdiction, whether
the items are consumed domestically or are exported.70 Consist-
ently, value that is added to goods and services outside the taxing
jurisdiction is beyond the scope of the tax, even if such items are
imported and consumed domestically. For example, assuming a ten
percent, origin principle VAT, if an importer imported goods for
$10,000 and added value of $3,000, reselling them for $13,000, the
imports would be free of VAT and the importer would charge $300
VAT on the $3,000 value it adds to the goods.
A destination principle VAT imposes tax on goods or services
consumed in the taxing jurisdiction, regardless of where the goods
are produced or services are rendered. Imports are taxed and ex-
ports are tax-free. 71 For example, the importer in the above exam-
ple would add $1,300 VAT to the tax-exclusive $13,000 sales price
for its goods. In effect, the import is taxed $1,000 and the $3,000
value added by the importer would be taxed $300 for a total VAT
of $1,300. Likewise, if a manufacturer exported goods produced do-
" If the wholesaler did not receive the benefit from the input tax credit until after it paid
VAT on its purchases, it would sustain some cash flow costs. This may occur if the tax
periods were long, such as three months, or if the wholesaler could not obtain a refund for
excess input tax credits.
70 On the origin versus destination principle taxes, see C. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 40;
Shibata, A Theory of Fiscal Harmonization in Free Trade, in Capital Flows and Interna-
tional Policy Harmonization 12-19 (H. English ed. 1979); Sullivan, Indirect Tax Systems in
the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom, in Fiscal Harmonization in
Common Markets 103 (C. Shoup ed. 1967).
" Typically, nations that have adopted a destination principle VAT do not tax imported
services and do not rebate VAT on all exported services. See, e.g., Value Added Tax Act,
1983, ch. 55, § 1, sched. 5, group 15 (the United Kingdom VAT).
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mestically, under a destination principle VAT, the exporting coun-
try would rebate all VAT attributable to the exported products.
For competitive reasons or because international trade is a signifi-
cant element in the nation's economy, foreign VATs employ the
destination principle.7" The destination principle VAT may be im-
plemented under an additive or sales-subtractive method of calcu-
lating VAT liability. However, under these forms, it may be more
difficult to identify the precise VAT component in exported
goods."
3. VAT-Exclusive or VAT-Inclusive Base
A VAT is imposed on the value of taxable goods and services.
For this purpose, the tax rate may be applied to the value of the
items inclusive or exclusive of VAT. 4 With an invoice method,
tax-inclusive base, assuming a 9.09% VAT and a $100 before-tax
price, the seller's tax-inclusive price would be $110.. With a tax-
inclusive base, there is no computational reason to list separately
the tax on sales invoices. With VAT hidden in the price of goods
and services, it still is easy for sellers to calculate their tax liability,
but more difficult for buyers to identify the tax paid.
To obtain the same revenue with a tax-exclusive as with a tax-
inclusive base, it is necessary to set the rate under the tax-exclu-
sive base at a higher level. For example, to raise the revenue ob-
tained with the above 9.09% rate applied to a tax-inclusive base,
the legislature must impose a ten percent rate to a tax-exclusive
base. Applying the ten percent rate to the $100 before-tax price
", As part of the harmonization of value added taxes within the Common Market, the
European Economic Community has proposed that member nations work toward the adop-
tion of the origin principle for commerce within the Community and the destination princi-
ple for trade with outsiders. See Sixth Council Directive of May 17, 1977 on the Harmoniza-
tion of the Laws Relating to Turnover Taxes-Common System of Value Added Tax:
Uniform Basis of Assessment, 20 J. 0. Comm. Eur. (No. L145) 1-2 (1977).
" See R. Lindholm, The Economics of VAT 167-75 (1980). For example, under the addi-
tive or sales-subtractive VAT, if an intermediate seller is exempt from VAT under a small
trader exemption, this loss of tax revenue is not recouped (as it is under an invoice VAT) at
a subsequent stage. The exporter who exports goods that include a component or a service
that was acquired from an exempt supplier cannot identify the precise VAT component in
the price of these exported goods. In these cases, it may be necessary to estimate the VAT
component, or to make some statutory assumption about the rebatable VAT element in
exports.
7' For a general discussion of a VAT levied on tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive prices, see A.
Tait, Value Added Tax 11-13 (1972).
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would result in the same ten dollar VAT and $110 tax-inclusive
price. According to one commentator, "the tax on a price exclusive
of tax is clearer, more honest, and less complicated than that lev-
ied on the tax inclusive base." 5 While the tax-exclusive base may
have some of the attributes just quoted above, it may not be less
complicated for retailers selling to final consumers. In particular,
small retailers without computerized cash registers may find it eas-
ier to apply the VAT rate to the total tax-inclusive prices for sales
than to convert sales totals to tax-exclusive amounts and then add
VAT to these figures."6 Indeed, some countries that employ a tax-
exclusive, invoice method tax have adopted simplified VAT proce-
dures that, in effect, give retailers the option to calculate their
VAT liability based on their tax-inclusive sales figures.
To calculate VAT under the additive method, the taxpayer must
total the factors of production for the tax period-wages, profit,
interest, and rent expense. Since the additive method does not
base tax liability on the sales price of taxable items, it would be
difficult to construct a tax-inclusive, additive method base.
The sales-subtractive VAT is based on gross taxable receipts less
allowable deductions. To the extent that this "period" tax is con-
sidered a business cost and is shifted into the price of the taxable
items (gross taxable receipts), the VAT will be imposed on the tax-
inclusive prices. Administratively, it would be difficult to impose a
sales-subtractive VAT on a tax exclusive base. To do so would re-
quire the identification of the VAT component in gross taxable re-
ceipts as well as in the cost of allowable deductions. Since it would
not be separately stated on purchase invoices, at best, the tax
could only be estimated.
4. Taxation of Capital Goods
Conceptually, under a VAT designed to be shifted to consumers,
the final consumers of taxed goods and services bear the VAT
component in the price of those items. Since business generally is
the final consumer of capital goods that it uses in its operations,
the legislature must decide if the business should bear VAT on
capital goods. If capital goods are included in the tax base, then
" Id. at 13.
"' See H.M. Customs & Excise Notice No. 727, Gross Takings, British Value Added Tax
Rep. (CCH) 10 (Oct. 1987).
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the VAT is described as a gross national product (GNP)-style
VAT. 77 Under a GNP-style tax, the VAT borne by business pre-
sumably will be shifted, as any other operating cost, into the prices
of that business' goods or services. For example, under an invoice
method VAT,78 the manufacturer calculates its output tax liability
based on the sales prices of its goods. These prices presumably in-
clude an allocable part of the cost of capital goods used to produce
the goods, including the VAT paid on such capital goods. Since the
manufacturer charges VAT on the sales price that includes some
VAT on capital goods, this VAT will have a tax-on-a-tax, or cas-
cade effect.7 s
With a national income (NI)-style VAT, 80 a business purchasing
capital goods can recover the VAT charged on such purchases
through a depreciation-like input tax credit over the estimated life
of the capital goods. For example, if a manufacturer purchases ten
year life machinery for $100,000 plus $10,000 VAT, then under an
invoice method VAT, 81 over the machinery's ten year life, the man-
ufacturer obtains a $10,000 input tax credit against its VAT liabil-
ity.82 With a NI-style VAT, if the manufacturer must finance the
$10,000 VAT charge, it must bear the interest cost on the loan as
part of its cost of operations.
The European VATs, as well as those enacted in most other
77 See C. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 188-90.
" A GNP-style VAT can be created under an additive or a sales-subtractive VAT as well.
Under the additive method, in computing profit, the taxpayer would be denied a deduction
both for the cost of capital goods purchased and for depreciation taken for income tax pur-
poses. The same treatment would be provided under a sales-subtractive VAT.
79 One reason VAT was viewed as an improvement over the prior European turnover
taxes is that the VAT could be designed to avoid the cascade effect that occurred under the
turnover taxes. Businesses in countries with turnover taxes found it tax advantageous to
vertically integrate their operations in order to reduce the number of taxable turnovers from
production to retail sale.
o See C. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 185-87.
"' The same treatment may be provided under an additive or sales-subtractive VAT.
Under the additive method, the taxpayer would recover the VAT charged on capital goods
by reducing profit through a depreciation deduction for the cost of such goods. Under the
sales-subtractive VAT, the taxpayer would reduce gross taxable receipts each year by an
amount equal to depreciation of the cost of the acquired capital goods.
8 The VAT could be recoverable at a rate of $1,000 per year over the 10-year life. The
$1,000 credit is based on the assumption that the VAT is creditable on a straight-line basis
over the estimated useful life of the capital goods. The legislature could provide other for-
mulas for the recovery of the VAT. For example, it may provide a shorter recovery period or
provide for the accelerated recovery of the credit, such as on a declining balance method.
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countries, are consumption (C)-style VATs.a3 Under an invoice
method,"4 C-style VAT, business purchasers of capital goods gener-
ally obtain an immediate input tax credit for VAT charged on such
goods. In the above example, the $10,000 VAT would be recovered
when the machine is acquired.8 5 Even with a C-style VAT, some
capital goods still remain in the VAT base because purchasers can-
not obtain an input tax credit for VAT charged on these goods. For
example, some units of government or other entities exempt from
VAT are not eligible for input tax credits. Likewise, taxable trad-
ers that produce or sell exempt goods cannot obtain input tax
credits for VAT charged on purchases allocable to their exempt
supplies. Also, private individuals who are final consumers of capi-
tal goods cannot recover VAT charged on such purchases.
The European preference for a C-style VAT may be traceable to
those countries' experiences with their turnover taxes that pre-
ceded VAT.8 eThe turnover tax was imposed on the sales price of
goods every time that the goods turned over in the process of pro-
duction and distribution. It therefore had a tax-on-a-tax, or cas-
cade effect. France and others switched to VAT to remove the cas-
cade effect.8 7 It therefore is not surprising that they chose the C-
style VAT which does not have the cascade effect of a GNP-style
See, e.g., Aaron, Introduction and Summary, in Value Added Tax: Lessons from Eu-
rope 3 (H. Aaron ed. 1981). If the United States were to adopt a federal VAT, it likely
would be a C-style VAT. The Ullman proposal for a federal VAT was a C-style VAT. See
House Bill, supra note 53, at 7483-85.
84 The same consumption base can be created under an additive or sales-subtractive
VAT. Under an additive method VAT, the cost of capital goods (but not depreciation)
would be deductible in arriving at profit included in the tax base. Under a sales-subtractive
VAT, the cost of capital goods (but not depreciation) would be fully deductible against gross
taxable receipts.
88 Under some VAT schemes, the credit for VAT paid on capital goods may be used to
reduce the business' VAT liability, and excess credits can be carried over to subsequent tax
periods, but it is not refundable if the business does not have any VAT liability for the tax
period. Consider, for example, the French VAT, under which traders can use input tax cred-
its to offset output tax liability, but before the 1972 reforms, any excess had to be carried
over to subsequent tax periods. See 4 Guides to European Taxation, Value Added Taxation
in Europe, France, § 8.2. (1973). With the 1972 reforms, excess credits arising in 1972 and
subsequent years are fully refundable. Id. at § 9.3. Under the former French approach, tax-
payers with excess credits for VAT paid on purchases had to bear the interest cost to carry
that VAT element until it received a VAT benefit from the credit in a future tax period.
88 See C. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 11-15.
87 See Advisory Comm. on Intergovernmental Relations, Value Added Tax and Alterna-
tive Sources of Revenue 5 (1973).
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VAT.
For a totally unrelated reason, it was predictable that the Euro-
pean nations would adopt C-style VATs. Their national economic
policies tend to encourage investment in capital goods in order to
make local industry competitive in the international marketplace
and thereby stimulate export trade, a significant component of
their GNP.8s A C-style VAT treats capital goods purchases more
favorably.
Debate over the taxation of capital goods under an American
VAT may focus on a comparison between the taxation of labor and
capital under a C-style and GNP-style VAT. For this purpose, as-
sume that an invoice method VAT that is charged on taxable items
is shifted forward to consumers. If the per unit cost of labor and
capital are identical, 9 a producer would have no incentive to re-
place labor with capital, or vice versa. If a GNP-style VAT were
added to existing federal taxes, capital would become more expen-
sive than labor. The output tax on sales includes the cost of labor
and capital shifted in the prices of the seller's goods and services,
thus taxing both alike. However, because the business bears the
VAT imposed on the purchase of capital goods and does not bear
VAT on the purchase of labor (hiring employees), the cost of capi-
tal is higher. A C-style VAT would maintain the prior equality be-
tween the cost of capital and labor because purchasers of capital
goods would receive an immediate rebate of VAT charged on such
capital goods, treating the purchase of capital and labor alike.90
C. Scope of the Tax Base
If the United States enacted an invoice method, C-style VAT
imposed on the tax-exclusive price of taxable items and based its
jurisdictional reach on the destination principle, it would'have a
VAT similar to those enacted in most other countries. However, it
" See C. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 178.
n The labor cost would include all payroll and other taxes imposed on the employment of
labor. The capital cost would include the interest cost attributable to the financing of the
capital goods purchases.
90 Some proponents of the C-style VAT carry this argument further and maintain that a
C-style VAT would encourage domestic industry to modernize, and thereby expand their
export trade. See Aaron, supra note 83, at 4-5. However, it is not clear that raising revenue
from a VAT rather than income taxes, and relying on a C-style, rather than a GNP- or NI-
style, VAT will have any significant impact on the balance of trade.
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still would have to resolve the most difficult problem in designing
a VAT system; that is, it would have to define the scope of the tax
base.
To construct a VAT with a consumption base, it is reasonable to
begin with personal consumption expenditures (PCEs), the major
component of the gross national product. Table 6 lists the ele-
ments of the American GNP for 1982.
Table 6
U.S. Gross National Product-1982*
(in billions $)
Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCEs)
Durable goods 252.7
Nondurable goods 771.0
Services 1027.0
Total 2,050.7
Gross Private Domestic Investment 447.3
Net of Exports over Imports
Exports 361.9
Imports 335.6
Total 26.3
Government Purchases
Federal 272.7
State and Local 369.0
Total 641.7
GNP 3,166.0
* Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, 66
Survey of Current Business 26, Table 1.1 (July, 1986).
If a federal VAT were imposed on all PCEs, using the 1982
figures, the $2,050.7 billion base would have represented sixty-five
percent of our GNP. To provide some perspective on this figure,
for 1982, taxable income reported on individual income tax returns
was $1,473 billion"1 and corporate income subject to the corporate
income tax was $205.2 billion, 2 a combined income tax base of
' Internal Revenue Service, supra note 18, at 39-42, Table 1.2.
92 Internal Revenue Service, 1982 Statistics of Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns
18, Table 1 (1985).
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$1,678.2 billion. Moreover, the consumption base could be ex-
panded beyond the above PCEs by taxing some government
purchases."
A tax levied on PCEs generally would be imposed on all goods
sold and services rendered in the private exchange economy- that
is, sales for value. 4 Congress may construct a broad-based VAT
and then reduce the VAT burden on specific goods and services by
providing a lower or even a zero rate for the preferred items. Even
with a zero rate, the supplies technically remain in the tax base. In
contrast, Congress can reduce the VAT burden on traders and pur-
chasers by exempting from VAT sales by certain sellers or sales of
specific goods and services. Both tax rate reductions and tax ex-
emptions are considered tax preferences. 5
A VAT preference may be based on the nature of the seller.
These preferences generally are limited to items provided by chari-
ties or governmental bodies, although many VAT schemes exempt
sales by small businesses. More commonly, VAT preferences de-
pend upon the nature of the goods sold or services rendered. These
item preferences typically apply to sales at all stages within the
production-distribution chain. However, in some cases, the prefer-
ences may be limited to sales made at only one stage, such as re-
tail. For example, a standard ten percent rate may apply to all tax-
able goods and services, but a reduced five percent rate may apply
to the sale of newspapers to final consumers. A higher twenty-five
percent rate might apply to the sale of gold jewelry at retail 96
As discussed above, under an invoice method VAT, the grant of
an item-by-item VAT preference either reduces the tax base by
exempting specific goods or services from tax or maintains the base
but reduces revenue by providing a lower or even zero rate. A
" See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
" To prevent potential tax avoidance, the tax may extend to goods and services trans-
ferred without adequate consideration. See The Value Added Tax Act, 1983, ch. 55, § 3,
sched. 2, group 5 (the United Kingdom VAT).
" The introduction of multiple rates or various forms of tax preferences complicates the
tax and significantly increases the cost to the government to administer and to the taxpay-
ers to comply with the tax. When the United Kingdom added a multiple rate to its VAT
system, it increased its customs and excise staff by 10%. See 890 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.)
303 (1975).
" For example, Senator Roth's bill provided a single stage exemption for some food,
housing, medical care, and land. See Senate Bill, supra note 54, at S5675.
"7 It is easier to administer a tax rate preference than an exemption, because the rate
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reduced or zero rate preference alters the output tax charged on
sales, while an exemption alters both the output tax on sales and
the input tax credit on purchases. The following example illus-
trates these three methods of providing transaction-based prefer-
ences under an invoice method VAT. Assume that a firm sells food
to final consumers. In a given tax period, the firm sells food for
$100,000 and pays $6,000 VAT on $60,000 purchases of inventory
and other items attributable to these taxable sales. The standard
VAT rate is ten percent.
1. If food sold to final consumers is taxed at a reduced five
percent rate, the seller charges the five percent rate on its
sales and obtains a full input tax credit for the ten percent
VAT paid on purchases allocable to these sales. The seller
thus is entitled to a $1,000 VAT refund for this tax period,
computed as follows:
Output Tax on Sales
5% x $100,000 $ 5,000
Input Tax on Purchases
10% x $60,000 $ 6,000
Net VAT liability $(1,000)
2. If food sold to final consumers is zero-rated, the seller does
not charge VAT on its sales and obtains an input tax credit
for VAT paid on purchases allocable to these sales. The
seller can recover the entire $6,000 VAT charged on its
purchases, computed as follows:
Output Tax on Sales
0% x $100,000 $ 0
Input Tax on Purchases
10% x $60,000 $ 6,000
Net VAT liability $(6,000)
preferences can be traced to sales. The exemption must be checked by reference both to
sales and to the input tax attributable to such exempt sales.
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3. If food sold to final consumers is exempt from VAT, the
seller does not charge VAT on sales and is not entitled to an
input tax credit for VAT charged on purchases allocable to
VAT-exempt sales. The seller does not have any output tax
liability and must absorb the $6,000 input tax on its
purchases.
Output Tax on Sales
0% x $100,000 $ 0
Input Tax on Purchases
10% x $60,000
(cannot be claimed as
credit since sales were
VAT-exempt) $ 0
Net VAT liability $ 0
The input tax credit (commonly referred to as the input tax de-
duction) mechanism is unique to the invoice method VAT. As il-
lustrated above, it facilitates the use of item-by-item preferences
or the use of preferred (lower) rates to selected items at the retail
stage without disrupting the system at earlier stages of production
and distribution. Also, unlike the state sales tax structure, where
sellers must determine whether the buyer is exempt from tax, the
sellers in an invoice method VAT system generally charge VAT
based on the nature of the item sold, not on the status of the buyer
or the use to which the buyer will put the item. 8 The buyer can be
relieved of tax on purchases by receiving credit for input tax on
purchases.
The gross tax base calculated under a sales-subtractive method
VAT includes the selling price (or value) of taxable items. As it can
do with an invoice method VAT, the legislature can narrow the
sales-subtractive VAT base by exempting entities or specific items.
The difference is that under the invoice method, revenue lost
through an entity or item exemption at an intermediate stage can
be recouped upon taxable sale at a subsequent stage. Under the
invoice method, this revenue recoupment is accomplished by not
98 Some VAT systems deviate from this model and require sellers to determine the nature
of the buyer or the use to which the buyer will put the item supplied. See, for example, the
VAT in the Republic of China, Business Tax Law, Art. 7(4), (6)-(7), 26-28 (H. Liu & M.
Olson trans. 1987) (copy on file).
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granting an input tax credit for any VAT component in the price
of goods or services purchased from exempt entities or any VAT
component in purchases that were exempt from VAT. The revenue
is permanently lost under the sales-subtractive VAT.
Still, a sales-subtractive base can be narrowed in a manner not
used under the invoice method. Taxpayers can be allowed deduc-
tions for costs or expenses that usually are included in a VAT base.
For example, taxpayers may be allowed deductions for employee
fringe benefits, even though compensation generally does not re-
duce a VAT base.
The additive method VAT is not a transactional tax and is not
linked to the sales price of taxable items. Under an additive
method VAT, it is feasible to exempt entities from the tax, but it is
difficult to grant preferences based on the nature of the goods sold
or the services rendered. For example, unless the statute is quite
complex, it would not be feasible to zero-rate or exempt from VAT
the sale of canned soup because the seller of the can and the pro-
vider of legal and other services to the canning company would
have to identify and zero-rate these sales and services. Alterna-
tively, the canning company would have to estimate and claim re-
fund for the VAT component in purchases attributable to sales of
the canned soup. If the wholesaler and retailer sold taxable items
as well as the soup, it also would be necessary for them to segre-
gate the factors of production that were attributable to the soup
and eliminate these amounts from their tax bases. That it is diffi-
cult to grant item preferences under an additive method VAT may
be viewed as an advantage of relying on this method of calculating
VAT liability. However, in its place, the additive method provides
the opportunity to reduce the base in other ways. By altering the
defir'* ion of profit, the legislature can permit deductions for costs
or expenses that typically are considered part of a VAT base. For
example, as illustrated in the above discussion of the sales-subtrac-
tive VAT, the legislature could allow taxpayers to deduct fringe
benefits in arriving at profit includable in the additive method
base, even though compensation is a major element in this VAT
base.
D. Mechanics of a Consumption-Style VAT
The following example illustrates the mechanical aspects of a C-
style VAT. It is based on an invoice method, destination principle
Value Added Tax
tax imposed at a standard ten percent rate and applied to the tax-
exclusive price of taxable supplies.
Assume that a manufacturer purchases aluminum, other raw
materials, and components for $30,000 (exclusive of VAT). Suppli-
ers to the manufacturer add a ten percent VAT of $3,000, charging
a total price of $33,000. The manufacturer then produces com-
puters and sells them to a retailer for $70,000 and adds $7,000
VAT, charging a $77,000 tax-inclusive price. In computing its net
VAT liability for the value that it has added, the manufacturer
reduces its $7,000 output tax on sales by the $3,000 input tax on its
purchases and remits to the government the $4,000 net. When the
retailer sells the computers to final consumers for $100,000 (exclu-
sive of tax), it adds $10,000 VAT and thus charges the consumers
$110,000. The retailer pays its net VAT liability of $3,000, repre-
sented by the difference between the $10,000 output tax on sales
and the $7,000 input tax on purchases. To the extent that the
$10,000 is shifted to buyers in the form of higher prices for the
computers and the consumers are not allowed any refund for VAT
paid, the final consumers bear the $10,000 VAT. Assuming the
VAT is shifted forward, with the same tax base and tax rate, a
VAT raises the same total revenue and has the same tax impact on
final consumers as a single-stage retail sales tax.
Manufacturer
Output tax on sales
$70,000 x 10% rate
Input tax on purchases
$30,000 x 10% rate
Net VAT liability
Retailer
Output tax on sales
$100,000 x 10% rate
Input tax on purchases
$70,000 x 10% rate
Net VAT liability
Final Consumers
VAT on purchases
$100,000 x 10% rate
No input tax credit
VAT borne by consumers
Tax paid to the
Government at each level
$ 7,000
$ 3,000
$ 4,000
$10,000
$ 7,000
$ 3,000
$10,000
$ 0
$10,000
3,000 paid by suppliers
4,000 paid by manufacturer
$ 3,000 paid by retailer
$10,000 Total tax paid
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V. STRUCTURAL REASONS TO REEXAMINE THE TAX SYSTEM
Adam Smith's four canons of taxation influenced tax policy for
almost a century. According to Smith, a tax (1) should foster na-
tional concepts of equity, (2) should be certain, not arbitrary, (3)
should be easy for taxpayers to pay, and (4) should be economical
for the government to collect.9 Recent United States tax reform
goals include Smith's first, third, and fourth canons promoting tax
equity and simplification, and add a canon that the tax reform
should promote economic growth.100 More broadly, federal taxes
should be imposed at acceptable rates, meet the desired short- and
long-term revenue needs, distribute the tax burden in an equitable
manner, facilitate both taxpayer compliance and efficient govern-
ment collection, and not inhibit economic growth. The 1986 tax
reform broadened the base and reduced the rates under the indi-
vidual and corporate income taxes. Future reforms of the income
taxes likely will focus on simplification of the corporate income tax
or adjustment of income tax rates to increase revenue. Congress
still may be pressed to consider the possible enactment of a new
broad-based federal tax on consumption to raise revenue or fi-
nance future income tax reforms. The debate over the desirability
of adding a federal tax on consumption should include the follow-
ing policy-relevant factors: the scope of the federal public sector,
federal tax base issues, economic considerations (including our
concept of vertical equity and the growing importance of interna-
tional commerce on our economy), concerns about taxpayer com-
pliance, and federal-state fiscal relations.
A. Scope of The Federal Public Sector
The federal budget reflects Congress' judgment on the extent to
which private resources should be diverted from saving or con-
sumption to public purposes. The 1986 revenue-neutral income tax
reforms left the federal budget with large deficits. Despite both
budget-cutting initiatives in Congress since the early 1980s and the
Gramm-Rudman Act, designed to help balance the federal
" A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 777-79
(Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937).
" See President's Proposal, supra note 1, at 2; 1 Treasury Proposal, supra note 1, at 8.
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budget, 10' Congress has not dramatically curtailed federal spend-
ing. The decision to reduce the deficit by reducing federal pro-
grams or increasing taxes is a political decision and will not be dis-
cussed here. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it is likely that in
future major tax legislative debates, Congress will consider the
possibility of increasing revenue. 0 2
B. Federal Tax Base
1. Introduction
One reason Congress might consider enacting a tax on consump-
tion, such as a VAT, is to reduce federal reliance on direct taxes
measured by income. Traditionally, the United States has relied
heavily on direct taxes (income and payroll) imposed at the source
of income for the bulk of federal revenue. In 1982, they accounted
for 80.8% of federal budget receipts. s03 Indirect taxes, accounting
for the remaining 11.2%, have played a more modest role in fed-
eral fiscal policy.
Federal taxes on consumption, indirect taxes generally imposed
on the sale of taxable goods or services, accounted for less than ten
percent of 1982 budget receipts.'" They include customs duties on
imported goods, windfall profits tax on crude oil, 0 5 excises on con-
sumer goods, such as alcohol, tobacco, gasoline and other fuels, and
excises on consumer services, such as telephone and air
transport. 06
State and local governments rely more heavily on indirect taxes
on consumption; most notably, the retail sales tax imposed on sales
to final consumers. 10 Under their sales tax regimes, states tax con-
101 See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
99 Stat. 1037.
102 For example, see ex-Senator Howard Baker's suggestion that Congress consider the
adoption of a new tax to repay the deficit. Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1985, at 40, col. 2.
'0' See supra p. 216, Table 4.
"o Id.
05 The crude oil may be used in the production of plastics or other components in con-
sumer goods, or may be refined into transportation or household fuel.
'" See 1984 Commissioner & Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service Ann. Rep. 2, Table
2.
107 As of 1986, only Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon did not levy a retail
sales tax. See Chart of State Taxes, 1 State Tax Guide (CCH) at 662-63; J. Due & J. Mike-
sell, supra note 43, at 4-5. In Alaska, there is a local, not state level sales tax. See Alaska
Stat. § 29.45.650 (1986).
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sumer goods, although some exempt necessities such as food and
medicine."'8 States vary significantly in their tax treatment of ser-
vices. About forty percent of the states do not tax services other
than utilities, admissions, and transient accommodations.10 9 At the
other extreme, only a few states impose sales tax on a broad range
of services."10 Thus, there is little consistency in the taxation of
consumer goods and services under federal, state and local taxes.
The tax burden on PCEs is distributed unevenly,"' distorting con-
sumption patterns by encouraging consumers to purchase untaxed
or low taxed items and discouraging them from purchasing heavily
taxed goods and services. The addition of a federal VAT, coupled
with repeal of some excises, would provide more consistency in the
federal taxation of consumption items. However, disparities would
remain among consumers in different states because of variations
in state sales tax bases, unless the states were to replace their sales
tax regimes with a VAT that mirrored the federal system.
2. Comparison of The Tax Base of Income and Payroll Taxes
and a Potential VAT
The federal individual income tax is imposed on labor income
and returns on capital, on sales of capital goods and other prop-
erty, and on other income that is not excludable by statute. It
taxes the wages of employees in the private sector as well as em-
ployees of income tax-exempt organizations and units of
government." 2
Labor costs account for about seventy-five percent of the value
108 See J. Due & J. Mikesell, supra note 43, at 65-70.
See id. at 90, Table 4.1.
110 See id.
. The 1986 guidelines for tax reform in Canada stress the need to have "similar prod-
ucts. . . bear the same rate of sales tax." Can. Dep't of Fin., Guidelines for Tax Reform in
Canada 3 (1986). In addition, according to Finance Minister Michael H. Wilson's statement,
"[t]he sales tax burden should be shared more equally than it now is among goods and
services and the sectors that produce them." Id. at 2. Under the federal sales tax, similar
products are treated differently, and "different rates of tax apply to various goods and ser-
vices..." Id. As a result, "an important part of the overall tax burden is very unevenly
distributed across the economy." Id. at 5.
112 It does not tax excludable receipts like gifts, life insurance proceeds, municipal bond
interest, some social security benefits, and other government transfer payments, such as
welfare.
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of PCEs.113 The existing federal system taxes American workers on
the value they add to goods and services, whether such goods and
services are consumed domestically or exported. Except for the ex-
cises and customs duties, Congress does not tax consumers on the
value of purchased goods and services, whether the purchases are
produced domestically or imported. Therefore, one essential differ-
ence between an income tax increase and a destination principle
VAT is that an income tax increase would tax all of the value
added by domestic labor; while the VAT would tax the foreign la-
bor component in imports and would not tax the value added by
domestic labor to exported goods or exempt sales by the charita-
ble-governmental sectors.
The corporate income tax is levied on business profits, on sales
of capital goods and other property, and on returns on passive in-
vestments. It does not tax the charitable-governmental sectors on
most of the gain they derive from sales of goods or rendition of
services."" Assuming the corporate income tax on business profits
is borne by the owners (shareholders), the domestic consumers of
the corporation's goods or services do not bear -a federal tax on the
profit component in the prices of these items.
The individual and corporate income taxes basically tax profits
from export sales by American companies, but not profits on im-
ports to the United States if earned abroad by foreign
corporations."'5
Payroll taxes are levied only on labor income of covered employ-
ees and self-employed individuals, and then only up to the wage
cap. Payroll taxes are imposed, whether the covered persons work
in the private or public sector or for charities, and whether their
labor adds value to exports or to goods sold or services rendered
domestically. They do not apply to the foreign labor component of
11' See, e.g., Taxation & Economic Policy Office, Mich. Dep't of the Treasury, Analysis of
the Michigan Single Business Tax 26 (1985) (stating that "[flor all businesses, compensation
[for 1981] represents 76.7 percent of the Michigan tax base or value added." If it is assumed
that one-half of the income from professional and other businesses, including farms, estates
and trusts, is personal service income, labor accounts for 85.5 percent of the tax base.).
"' Income tax-exempt organizations as well as state colleges and universities may be sub-
ject to income tax on unrelated business taxable income under § 511(a). See I.R.C. § 511(a).
"' See I.R.C. §§ 881 (mainly taxing passive United States source income of a foreign
corporation), 882 (taxing income of a foreign corporation only if it is "effectively connected
with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States"). But see I.R.C. §§ 951-70
(taxing American shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation on Subpart F income).
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imported goods or services. In the short term, the employer bears
its share of payroll taxes and therefore may shift this tax to con-
sumers of their goods or services. In the long term, however, it is
likely that labor bears the full payroll tax burden."' Consequently,
payroll taxes likely will have the same impact as the individual in-
come tax on consumers of the employer's goods or services; that is,
consumers of these goods or services would not bear the federal tax
imposed on the labor component of goods or services.
The payroll tax has a narrower base than the broad-based VAT,
because the VAT base includes returns on capital (profit, rent, and
interest) as well as the labor component in the prices of taxed
goods and services. Indeed, the labor component of a VAT base
generally may be broader than the base of payroll taxes such as
our social security taxes for two reasons. First, wages of covered
workers are taxed only up to the wage cap. Second, payroll taxes
are not imposed on the labor performed on goods imported for sale
in the United States," 7 while foreign labor costs included in the
selling price of goods imported for sale in the United States are
included in the VAT base. In some respects, the payroll tax base is
larger than the likely labor component of a VAT base. Services
provided by employees of governmental entities, income tax-ex-
empt organizations, and other entities making exempt supplies
may be subject to payroll taxes but not VAT. On balance, VAT
probably would have a broader base and would be borne by a
larger number of individuals.
A broad-based, C-style VAT is levied on sales of taxable goods
and services. VAT may be viewed as a mechanism to tax the four
factors of production'"-labor, profit,"9 rent, and interest-that
add value at each stage of production and distribution. However,
,"I See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
,,7 See Brannon, Does VAT Provide a Balance of Trade Advantage?, 30 Tax Notes 1387
(March 31, 1986). Foreign labor also does not benefit directly from the government pro-
grams financed with the payroll tax revenue. Id. at 1390.
"" To the extent other expenses, such as charitable contributions and taxes, are shifted
into the price of the taxable goods and services, such payments also would be included in
the VAT base. The seller would not obtain an input tax credit attributable to these costs,
because charities and units of government cannot issue tax invoices for these receipts.
1I Operating losses constitute a reduction in the tax base to the extent that the losses are
reflected in a lower price of goods or services. Operating losses also reduce the income tax
bases to the extent that they can offset profits from other activities or profits from the same
activity in past or future years.
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unlike the income and payroll taxes that tax factor incomes to
those earning the income, the VAT typically is borne by the con-
sumers of goods and services, not by the business that employs
these factors of production to add value to the taxed items. Also,
unlike the income and payroll taxes that are imposed as the tax-
payers earn income, the invoice method VAT is not levied until the
sale of the taxable goods and services created with the factor
incomes.
The VAT base can be illustrated with the following example in-
volving a ten percent tax. For purposes of this example, it is as-
sumed that all sales during the tax period consist of inventory pur-
chased in that period, all labor costs are included in the prices of
the goods sold in that period, and all goods are sold domestically.
Elements of Profit for Period
Sales $100,000
Cost of goods sold (excluding $6,000 VAT) $ 60,000
Gross Income from Sales $ 40,000
Expenses
Labor $10,000
Rent $ 1,000
Interest $ 500
Depreciation $ 1,000 *
Taxes $ 700
Charitable Contributions $ 300
Other purchases (such as
utilities on which the
sellers charged $300 VAT) $ 3,000
Total expenses $16,500
Profit for period $23,500
Depreciation is attributable to $5,000 (exclusive of VAT) in
capital goods purchased this period. For purposes of this analy-
sis, it is assumed that such goods have a useful life of five years
and the taxpayer utilizes straight-line depreciation.
With the above elements of profit and sales for the period, the
trader would have a $3,200 net VAT liability, whether VAT was
calculated under the European-style invoice method or the addi-
tive method.
19871 247
Virginia Tax Review
VAT Base Under Above Invoice Method
Sales $100,000
Less
Inventory purchases $60,000
Other purchases $ 3,000
Capital goods purchased $ 5,000
Total $ 68,000
Tax Base $ 32,000
VAT Liability for Tax Period-Invoice Method
Output Tax
Sales $100,000 x 10% VAT rate $ 10,000
Less
Input Tax
Inventory purchases $60,000 x 10% $6,000
Other purchases $3,000 x 10% $ 300
Capital goods purchased $5,000 x 10% $ 500
Total $ 6,800
Net VAT due $ 3,200
Components of VAT Base and Tax Liability
Additive Method
Profit (adding back in depreciation) $24,500
Labor $10,000
Rent $ 1,000
Interest $ 500
Taxes $ 700
Charitable contributions $ 300
Total $37,000
Less capital goods purchased $ 5,000
Total base $32,000
10% VAT rate .10
Net VAT due $ 3,200
Thus, the additive VAT base includes the four factors of produc-
tion as well as payments of taxes and charitable contributions (the
latter are not taxed to the payee) to the extent that all of these
costs are shifted by the payor into the prices of its taxable prod-
ucts or services. The invoice method VAT base also includes pay-
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ments of taxes and contributions that are shifted into the selling
price of taxable goods and services. Thus, these VAT bases do not
include payments by individuals of their personal tax liabilities or
their personal charitable contributions, nor payments of taxes and
contributions by VAT-exempt entities. Ultimately, consumers of
taxable goods and services bear VAT on shifted taxes and contri-
butions made by sellers in the production-distribution chain. De-
pending upon the scope of the VAT base, however, consumers may
not bear VAT on the services the charities and units of govern-
ment provide with the tax revenue and contributions.
Viewed from the perspective of the final consumers who bear the
tax burden, a VAT is imposed on taxable goods and services,
whether the purchase price is paid out of income already subjected
to income and payroll taxes, receipts exempt from these taxes, or
funds from accumulated wealth.
3. VAT as a Tax on Business or on Consumers
a. Introduction
In this article, it is assumed that any American VAT will be a C-
style tax that eliminates producer or capital goods from the tax
base. A C-style VAT may be imposed as a tax on business or as a
tax on final consumers. If the VAT is designed as a tax on busi-
ness, the tax burden may be allocated among traders in relation to
the value each adds to taxable goods and services and the value of
its taxable imports. If VAT is designed as a tax on final consumers
of taxable goods and services, the tax burden may be allocated
among consumers in relation to the amount of taxable goods and
services they purchase. Whether the legislature describes the VAT
as a tax to be borne by business or by consumers, the tax likely
will be shifted by business in most instances and will be borne by
consumers. Nevertheless, the legislative intent to tax business or
consumers may affect the design of the tax base.
If the VAT is intended to tax business, then the legislature logi-
cally may grant tax preferences based on the nature of the seller.
Congress could decide, for administrative reasons, to remove from
the tax rolls traders making sales of taxable goods and services be-
low a minimum amount for a specified period, such as a quarter or
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a year.12 0 For constitutional reasons, the legislature also may ex-
empt units of government, at least to the extent that they supply
goods or services in the exercise of their essential governmental
functions. 12 For political reasons, the legislature also may exempt
other supplies by units of government or supplies by some or all
income tax-exempt organizations. If the legislature intends to use
VAT in order to allocate part of the cost of government among
businesses in relation to the value they add to goods and services,
then it is difficult to justify VAT exemptions based on the nature
of the item sold, such as sales by farmers and construction compa-
nies, or services by medical practitioners and financial
intermediaries.122
If, instead, the legislature intends to impose VAT on consumers,
then it should define the scope of the tax by reference to the na-
ture of the supply. The legislature may grant item-by-item prefer-
ences for social, economic, or administrative reasons. For example,
to reduce the regressive effects of a tax borne by consumers, the
legislature may remove VAT from the cost of necessities such as
food, housing, and medical care.123 While, from a policy perspec-
120 For example, under the British VAT, a person is a taxable person subject to VAT if he
is, or is required to be, registered. Registration is required if a person makes taxable sup-
plies exceeding 6,000 pounds sterling in a quarter or exceeding 18,000 pounds sterling for
four quarters. The Value Added Tax Act, 1983, ch. 55, §§ 2(1)-(2), sched. 1(1).
"' See Special Comm. on the Value-Added Tax of the Section of Tax'n, ABA, Technical
Problems in Designing a Broad-Based Value-Added Tax for the United States, 28 Tax Law.
193, 201-05 (1975).
"' Common Market and other countries with VATs imposed on consumers typically
grant preferences for food, housing, medical care and some services of financial in-
termediaries. For example, the United Kingdom grants zero rating for food, buildings and
certain fuel, and exemptions for land, health services, and certain financial services. The
Value Added Tax Act, 1983, ch. 55, § 12, sched. 5 & 6.
123 This goal can be accomplished in two different ways. The legislature may tailor such
exemptions to the targeted low income consumers by granting them a credit against their
income tax liability for all or a portion of the VAT they must pay on their purchases. To
provide the benefit of the credit to individuals who are not on the individual income tax
rolls, the legislature would have to make the credit refundable. While the refundable nature
of the credit would increase the effectiveness of the credit in reaching intended benefi-
ciaries, it would also result in the submission of some kind of return by those otherwise not
on the income tax rolls, countering the recent trend to reduce the number of taxpayers on
the rolls. See The President's Proposal, supra note 1, at 5. In addition, the legislature may
have to provide a definition of income that is more consistent with the economic rather than
the Code concept of income. In the alternative, the legislature may exempt these necessities,
whether purchased by low or high income consumers. This exemption-by-product approach
reduces the tax base more than the tax credit option.
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tive, the base of a VAT levied on consumers should depend upon
the nature of the items purchased, it is inevitable that the legisla-
ture would grant at least some VAT exemptions based on the na-
ture of the seller. 2 " For administrative reasons, Congress may re-
move small traders from the VAT rolls.'25 Other supplier
exemptions may be prompted by political rather than administra-
tive or equity considerations. For example, subject to an unrelated
business concept,'26 Congress may exempt sales by section
501(c)(3) charitable organizations 2 7 or units of government.
In defining the base of a VAT imposed on consumers, the legis-
lature could start with the Commerce Department's list of PCEs,
and then reduce this potential tax base by granting preferences for
some items on this list and/or for some suppliers of these items.
Alternatively, the legislature could start with a base consisting of a
combination of PCEs and value added by the charitable-govern-
mental sectors of the economy and then narrow this potential base
by removing goods and services from either or both group(s). In
the following material, these two sources for a comprehensive VAT
base will be considered separately. 2
b. Personal Consumption Expenditures
If the legislative intent is to impose VAT on personal consump-
1' If the exempt supplier is selling goods or rendering services to a taxable trader, the
loss of revenue resulting from this "supplier" exemption is recouped at the next taxable
stage. This revenue recoupment occurs under an invoice method VAT because the buyer
charges VAT on the sales price of its goods or services and does not reduce this output tax
liability by any portion of the cost of the items purchased from the exempt supplier.
328 See, e.g., The Value Added Tax Act, 1983, ch. 55, § 12, sched. 1(1) (providing for a
small trader exemption from the United Kingdom VAT).
126 See I.R.C. §§ 511-15 (pertaining to income tax-exempt organizations and the unrelated
business concept).
17 Section 501(c)(3) charities include organizations operated for religious, charitable, sci-
entific, literary or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or ani-
mals. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
128 There are other tax base issues that should be considered, but they are beyond the
scope of this article. For example, should a VAT base include the sale by businesses of
assets other than in the ordinary course of business? Such sales include bulk sales of inven-
tory and sales of depreciable and intangible property by a business in the process of liquida-
tion or sale of all or a portion of its operating assets. The businesses typically have obtained
an input tax credit for VAT charged on the purchase of these assets. It therefore would be
appropriate to charge VAT on the resales. If taxable traders purchased the assets, they
could take an input tax credit on such purchases. If nontaxable persons, such as final con-
sumers, acquired the assets, they should bear VAT on such purchases.
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tion of goods and services, Congress could construct the base by
reference to the Commerce Department's report of PCEs. Some
commentators have constructed possible VAT bases, using this
data. For example, using the 1970 data on PCEs, Professor
McLure projected a VAT base equal to 75.5 % of PCEs, if Congress
granted limited preferences, and a base of 46.6% of PCEs, if Con-
gress granted more liberal preferences.1 29 Using Professor
McLure's assumptions and updating the data to 1986 levels, the
estimated tax base with his list of limited preferences would be
74.9% of PCEs and, with his list of more liberal preferences,
49.6% of PCEs, as follows:
"' See McLure, Jr., supra note 51, at 165, Table 2.
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Table 7
Limited Liberal
PCEs'3 ° Exemptions Exemptions
(in billions $)
Food & tobacco'3' 532.0 522.6 333.2
Clothing, accessories
& jewelry 32  209.1 209.0 209.0
Personal care 3' 41.4 41.4 41.4
Housing 436.9 - -
Household operation. 34  343.0 333.3 212.2
Medical care expenses' 35 357.8 357.8 -
Personal business 3 6  195.1 84.6 46.9
Transportation 37  365.3 360.1 360.1
Recreation' 198.0 186.9 186.9
Private education &
research 46.9 - -
Religious & welfare
activities 62.4 -
Foreign travel &
other, net 11.9 -
Total 2,799.8 2,095.7 1,389.7
% of PCEs 100 74.9 49.6
130 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 67 Survey of Current Bus-
iness 32, Table 2.4 (July, 1986) [herinafter Commerce Survey].
' ' Limited exemptions remove food furnished to employees (including military) and food
produced and consumed on farms. Liberal exemptions also remove purchased meals, bever-
ages and tobacco products.
' Whether the base has limited or liberal exemptions, it removes only standard clothing
issued to military personnel.
' There are no exemptions in this category, whether the base is constructed with limited
or liberal exemptions.
'31 With limited exemptions, domestic services are removed from the tax base. With lib-
eral exemptions, household utilities also are removed.
' With limited exemptions, all medical care expenses remain in the tax base, but with
liberal exemptions, all medical care is removed from the base.
,S' With limited exemptions, two categories are removed-expenses of handling life insur-
ance, and services furnished without payment by financial intermediaries except life insur-
ance carriers and private pension plans that are not insured. With liberal exemptions, legal
services and funeral, and burial expenses also are removed.
137 With limited and liberal exemptions, bridge, tunnel, ferry, and road tolls, as well as
local transit systems are removed from the tax base.
138 With limited or liberal exemptions, the following items are removed from the tax base:
admissions to legitimate theaters and opera, entertainments of nonprofit institutions (ex-
cept athletics); clubs and fraternal organizations except insurance; and parimutual net
receipts.
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With a VAT base containing the above limited exemptions of
PCEs, the tax in 1986 would have raised about $21 billion per one
percent rate VAT, and with more liberal exemptions, it would have
raised about $14 billion per one percent rate VAT. In contrast,
Chairman Ullman estimated that his proposed VAT would have
raised, in 1981 about $11.5 billion per one percent rate VAT. s13
The federal, state and local governments tax consumers of ser-
vices in a very haphazard fashion, with some services taxed at
more than one level of government and other services not taxed at
all. Services, in 1986, accounted for approximately 34.4% of the
GNP and fifty-two percent of PCEs.14 0 It is likely that the service
sector will continue to grow. Indeed, with the technological obso-
lescence of the work force in the production section, one mathema-
tician estimated that by the year 2000, the United States will need
only two percent of the labor force to produce all American-made
goods.
141
Though consumption taxes in the United States are relatively
modest by Western standards, " 2 these taxes are imposed predomi-
nantly on goods. Services tend to increase with individual or family
income. A federal VAT imposed on a broad range of consumer ser-
vices, as well as on consumer goods, would expand the subject of
American taxes.
There have been two major bills proposing a federal VAT. The
preferences proposed under each of these bills are different. Repre-
sentative Ullman's 1980 proposal for a invoice method VAT 4 3 in-
cluded preferences for some PCEs. It zero-rated retail sales of food
and sales by farmers and fishermen, housing, medical care, mass
transportation in urban areas, exports, interest,1 4 4 and supplies by
section 501(c)(3) organizations other than as part of an unrelated
"' See Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Explanation of
the "Tax Restructuring Act of 1980" 1-2 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter Tax
Restructuring].
"' See Commerce Survey, supra note 130, at 20, Table 1.1. This percentage depends upon
the standard used in classifying economic activities as goods or services. This figure is based
on National Income and Product Accounts.
"4 See R. Barnet & R. Muller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corpora-
tions 325-26 (1974) (citing Rand mathematician Richard Bellmann's prediction of this two
percent figure).
',' See supra p. 214, Table 3.
,, See House Bill, supra note 53, at 7484.
'" See Tax Restructuring, supra note 139, at 16-17.
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business. 45 Senator Roth's proposed Business Transfer Tax in-
cluded single-stage exemptions for some food, housing, medical
care, and land. 46
Typically, items acquired for investment, such as stocks, bonds,
and futures contracts, are not deemed items of personal consump-
tion and therefore should not be included in the VAT base. How-
ever, there are many items that possess elements of both invest-
ment and personal consumption, such as paintings and other art
objects, land, and collectors' items. The last category includes anti-
ques, coins and stamps, and military relics. These mixed invest-
ment-consumption goods generally are not used-up by the final
consumer, but may be stored or placed on display in the owner's
residence or place of business and, ultimately, resold. Theoreti-
cally, the VAT-ability of the mixed investment-consumption item
should depend upon the use to which the goods are put. If the
goods are displayed at home, their use may be viewed as predomi-
nantly consumption and thereby taxable, but the same painting
stored in a vault may be held predominantly for investment and
therefore should not be subject to VAT. An administrative advan-
tage of VAT over the way retail taxes have developed in the
United States is that under the VAT, the seller charges VAT based
on the nature of the supply, not the nature of the buyer or the
reported purpose to which the buyer intends to put the item. For
this reason, and for administrative simplicity, the legislature may
arbitrarily tax these mixed purpose purchases, notwithstanding the
investment quality of the purchase to some buyers.
Congress could use a VAT base to offset the distortions in con-
sumption created by some income tax exemptions, such as those
exemptions for in-kind services. The individual income tax system,
for example, encourages employees to bargain for part of their
wage package in the form of health and accident insurance rather
than in cash because the insurance benefits are not subject to in-
come tax. 47 The grant of these income tax preferences distorts in-
"" See id. at 17. Supplies by other income tax-exempt organizations are taxable only if a
charge or fee is made for such supplies. Id.
' See Senate Bill, supra note 54, at S5676-77.
... The system also encourages taxpayers to bargain for other nontaxable fringe benefits,
such as free parking at work, meals provided on the business premises, free flights for airline
employees, group legal services, and educational assistance benefits.
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dividual consumption choices.1 48 Congress could tax these benefits
under a VAT by providing that a business may serve as surrogate
taxpayer for the final consumer. Thus, under an invoice method
VAT, a business can be denied an input tax credit for VAT
charged on business travel and entertainment expenses as well as
on automobiles purchased for the personal use of employees or
owners.1 49 Likewise, the input tax credit may be denied for VAT
charged on business purchases of inventory, such as food or cloth-
ing, that are applied for the personal use of such individuals.
c. Sales and Services by Charitable-Governmental Sectors
A taxable trader's payments of taxes and charitable contribu-
tions are included in its VAT base to the extent that such pay-
ments are included in the trader's prices or fees charged for its
goods and services. In effect, under an invoice method VAT, the
taxable trader serves as surrogate tax collector on the portion of
the services provided by the payee unit of government or charity
with the taxes and charitable contributions made by such trader.
The trader does not obtain an input tax credit for the payments
because VAT is not charged on such payments. Such tax ulti-
mately is paid by the final consumers of the goods and services
acquired from such taxable traders. For example, assume busi-
nesses in City A pay $10 million of the $20 million local property
taxes used to finance education. Assume further that these busi-
nesses shift the $10 million cost into the prices of their taxable
products, collecting a ten percent VAT on this $10 million. The $1
"4 This distortion was more prevalent before Congress' decision, effective in 1985, to cur-
tail the scope of nontaxable fringe benefits, see I.R.C. § 132, and its decision in 1986 to
disallow 20% of business expenses for certain meals and entertainment, the latter a form of
consumption by employees receiving these items without charge. See I.R.C. § 274(n). This
same 20' disallowance rule applies to business payments for meals excludable from the
employee's income under § 119 of the Code.
"' Unless Congress combined the enactment of a VAT with the repeal of the remaining
income tax preferences for certain services, the federal tax system still would distort con-
sumers' choices by encouraging taxpayers to receive some of their income in services not
subject to income tax. If Congress subjected health and accident insurance to VAT, see
I.R.C. § 106(a) (excluding the value of such employer-provided coverage), it might recon-
sider the rationale for the income tax preference for the nonprofit organizations providing
this kind of service to final consumers, especially since income represents one of the four
economic factors of production included in the VAT base. A study of possible VAT prefer-
ences may trigger a reexamination of the rationale for the above described kind of income
tax preferences.
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million VAT attributable to these taxes will be borne by final con-
sumers of these products. Indirectly, final consumers pay VAT on
the $10 million of educational services provided by City A. The
local residents of City A pay the other $10 million in local property
taxes. No VAT is paid on this $10 million in educational services
that they finance.
Any American VAT would undoubtedly include preferences for
some supplies by the charitable-governmental sectors. For exam-
ple, under the Ullman bill, both sales to units of government 50 and
educational services provided by governmental entities were zero
rated.1"' Under Senator Roth's proposed Business Transfer Tax,
units of government and income tax-exempt organizations were
not taxed, except that the latter were taxed on receipts allocable to
unrelated business income.1"'
It is beyond the scope of this article to debate the justification
for potential VAT preferences for the charitable-governmental sec-
tors, based on the nature of the supply or the nature of the sup-
plier. However, such preferences may significantly reduce the po-
tential tax base and increase the complexity of the tax, detracting
from some of the professed advantages of adding a broad-based
VAT to the federal tax system.
4. Demographic Aspects of the Tax Base
A VAT may be an attractive new revenue source if current and
anticipated demographic changes reduce the existing income and
payroll tax bases. A federal VAT would provide a desirable offset
to this tax base cut. The following discussion focuses on two demo-
graphic changes that may influence the future federal income and
payroll tax bases-the aging population and the increase in the
proportion of two-job couples. As our population ages, we experi-
ence a reduction in the ratio of workers to retirees."6 3 Ultimately,
this shift may alter the balance between payroll tax receipts and
the cost of social security and medicare programs financed with
'50 See Tax Restructuring, supra note 139, at 17. This is an unusual form of VAT prefer-
ence because it places on the seller the responsibility to identify the preference by reference
to the nature of the buyer.
1 See id. Other sales by governmental entities are taxable only if the entities make a
separate charge or fee for such supplies. Id.
"' Senate Bill, supra note 54, at S5662.
"5 See J. Pechman, supra note 24, at 1204.
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these taxes. There are other tax base ramifications associated with
our aging population. Past and some current incentives to defer
income through contributions to pension and profit-sharing plans,
Individual Retirement Accounts, or other retirement programs
have created a reservoir of deferred income that will become taxa-
ble as the retirees withdraw these savings for post-retirement con-
sumption. However, this built-in tax base merely offsets retirees'
typically lower taxable income. Since retirees typically are replaced
by lower paid workers, it is likely that, on balance, the individual
income tax base will decline unless the number of workers or their
per capita income increases.
If a reduction in the number of workers to retirees creates a need
for additional revenue, should Congress raise this revenue from the
existing individual income or payroll taxes, or should it enact a
new VAT? The individual income tax would raise revenue from
retirees as well as workers. Payroll taxes would increase the tax
burden on workers, not retirees. In effect, Congress would increase
the payroll tax burden on the children of retirees in order to fi-
nance the programs benefitting their retired parents. If, instead,
Congress adopted a new VAT, the tax would be borne by retirees
as well as workers in proportion to the amount of taxable con-
sumer goods and services purchased by each group. Retirees that
bore income and payroll taxes during their working years now
would bear VAT on purchases financed with their after-income tax
savings. A new VAT creates an inevitable transitional problem re-
sulting from a switch from a federal system relying heavily on
taxes imposed on income at its source to a system relying on taxes
imposed in part at the source of income and in part at the point of
use of income for consumption. However, if such a tax is otherwise
desirable, this transitional problem should not form the basis for
rejecting a federal tax on consumption. To provide relief for the
retirees, the legislature could adjust the retirees' income tax bur-
den or their social security benefits.
The increase in the number of two-job couples has produced a
change in the demography of the American work force. With the
cut in the top individual tax rate, it is predictable that this trend
will continue."" The resulting increase in the number of workers
'1 For a discussion of some of the policy issues relating to the choice of the taxable unit
as an individual or a family, see McIntyre, Fairness to Family Members Under Current Tax
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ultimately may reduce wage rates. Yet, both husband and wife will
contribute fully to payroll tax revenue. They also combine their
incomes for purposes of the individual income tax. In some cases,
their combined income may be taxed at a higher effective tax rate
than if they were unmarried.' 55 In contrast, VAT liability is based
on the level of taxable consumption, not on the consumer's marital
or family status.
Anticipated demographic changes in the work force resulting in
increased taxable wages subject to income and payroll taxes,
should offset some of the negative aspects of our aging population.
On balance, alterations in the tax base resulting from the above
demographic changes should not influence the composition of the
federal tax structure.
5. Summary
The enactment of a VAT may expand the federal tax base by
imposing tax on economic activity that is beyond the scope of the
income tax bases. For example, to the extent that taxpayers use
savings or untaxed income for taxable consumption items, the gov-
ernment would obtain revenue from sources not covered by ex-
isting income and payroll taxes. In addition, taxable traders' con-
tributions to charities and taxes paid to units of government are
included in an invoice method VAT base to the extent that such
payments are included in the prices of the traders' taxable goods
sold or services rendered. To the extent that these contributions or
taxes are deductible for income tax purposes, they are not included
in the income tax bases.
Reform Proposals, 4 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 155 (1985); see also Munnell, The Couple Versus the
Individual Under Federal Personal Income Tax, in The Economics of Taxation 247-78 (H.
Aaron & M. Boskin ed. 1980) (outlining family income tax planning).
151 This marriage penalty, ameliorated prior to 1987 by the special deduction for the two
job couple, still remains for some couples after tax reform, despite the fact that there are
only two rate brackets. For example, assume that after 1987, W earns $22,000 and H earns
$20,000 income. If they were married, filing separate returns, then after taking the $3,000
standard deduction, see I.R.C. § 63(c)(2), and the $1,950 personal exemption, see I.R.C.
§ 151(d) W would have taxable income of $17,050 and H would have taxable income of
$15,050. At the 15% rate, see I.R.C. §1(a), W's tax would be $2,577.50 and H's tax would be
$2,257.50, for a total of $4,835. If they were married, filing a joint return, after taking a
$5,000 standard deduction and $3,900 for two exemptions, their taxable income would be
$33,100 and their tax would be $5,400.50, $565.50 more than if they were unmarried.
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C. Economic Considerations
Many of the policy-relevant considerations listed above have ec-
onomic implications. In addition, VAT advocates frequently claim
that there are economic advantages of adding this national sales
tax to our federal tax system. ' The analysis in this subsection
covers the impact of taxes on inflation, capital formation and sav-
ings, equity or fairness, and economic efficiency. For purposes of
this discussion, it is assumed that federal revenue must be in-
creased. Thus, for each economic issue, the impact of a new VAT
will be compared with increases in existing federal taxes. Finally,
this subsection concludes with a discussion of the desirability and
feasibility of adopting a VAT as a fiscal tool to promote national
economic goals.
1. Inflation and Price Stability
Inflation is recognized as a complex process influenced by many
cost-push factors. 5 In the past, inflation significantly affected
federal tax revenue. As price increases prompted increases in
money incomes, wage inflation pushed taxpayers into higher tax
rate brackets.15 8 Indeed, due to the progressive rate structure, indi-
vidual income tax collections increased by more than the inflation
rate, producing a "fiscal dividend." Beginning in 1985, Congress
curtailed this inflation dividend by adjusting the individual income
tax rate brackets for inflation. 59 With the two rate individual in-
come tax enacted as part of the 1986 tax reforms, Congress has
precluded an inflation dividend from the taxpayers already in the
top rate bracket. 160 Inflation in wages and prices still increases
' See, e.g., R. Lindholm, A New Federal Tax System 127-40 (1984).
167 See R. Goode, The Individual Income Tax 291 (1976).
"' See J. Pechman, supra note 24, at 16. According to Pechman, at 1984 income levels
and tax rates, 10% inflation would increase federal receipts about "$105 billion a year, or
2.6 percent of potential GNP." Id. For decades, Congress used part of this fiscal dividend to
cut individual income taxes in the biennial congressional election years and used the re-
mainder to finance the expansion of federal programs. See E. Tuyle, Political Control of the
Economy 137 (1978). This automatic inflation-induced boost in personal income tax reve-
nues ("bracket creep") occurred without congressional action. See J. Pechman, supra note
24, at 109.
,' See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1(f).
Taxpayers in the 28% rate bracket still may be affected by inflation if their inflated
income pushes them into the five percent surtax range. See I.R.C. § 1(g). Even with this two
rate system, Congress provided inflation adjustments by providing for the indexing of the
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payroll tax revenues tied to wages, and inflation in prices automat-
ically increases excise taxes that are measured by the selling price
for taxed goods and services, but inflation does not change the ef-
fective payroll or excise tax rates.
161
It is unlikely that VAT would perform better than existing taxes
as a tool to stabilize the economy during periods of full employ-
ment. Indeed, there is scant evidence that taxes, per se, influence
inflation by significantly affecting consumer demand, wage rates,
or the money supply.6 2 Changes in taxes act as stabilizers if they
offset "the effects on income and output that would otherwise be
associated with autonomous fluctuations in demand.'1 3 Changes
in individuals' income and payroll tax burdens alter after-tax
spendable funds (usually measured by disposable personal income)
and thereby may influence the level of potential consumer demand
for goods and services. However, the impact of these taxes on con-
sumer demand and on inflation probably is less than other factors,
such as "the composition of income, wealth, liquidity, previous and
expected future levels of income and consumption, and demo-
graphic variables.'" s
A progressive individual income tax, without inflation adjust-
ments, provides some automatic stabilizing effect on prices,s5 but
not necessarily on wages.'66 Traditionally, during periods of infla-
tion, the effective individual income tax rates increase and spend-
able income decreases. With the indexation of the tax rate brackets
and the planned reduction to two tax brackets, Congress has re-
duced the stabilizing effect of the individual income tax. A switch
tax rate brackets and the standard deduction for tax years after 1988, and the indexing of
personal exemptions for tax years after 1989. See I.R.C. §§ 1(f), 63(b)(4), 151(d)(3).
161 As flat rate taxes, most excise taxes do not have the bracket creep effect of the pro-
gressive individual income tax. Inflation also does not affect excises based on the number or
volume of the items sold, such as alcohol, tobacco and gasoline taxes.
612 Brown, Reflections on Fiscal Policy, in The Economics of Taxation, supra note 154, at
349, 354.
,63 R. Goode, supra note 157, at 272.
,6, Id. at 280.
166 If inflation occurs during periods of high unemployment, the built-in increases in per-
sonal income tax may precipitate further declines in production and employment. See Bai-
ley, Inflationary Distortions and Taxes, in Inflation and the Income Tax 291, 313 (H. Aaron
ed. 1976). A direct tax on consumption, such as a progressive expenditure tax, would have
less built-in flexibility than the individual income tax simply because consumption is more
stable than income. R. Goode, supra note 157, at 278.
"' See R. Goode, supra note 157, at 289.
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from individual income tax to VAT therefore may not reduce the
stabilizing effect of federal taxes on prices.
The corporate income tax generally does not influence inflation,
but its impact depends, in part, upon who bears this tax. If the
corporate tax is shifted into product prices, then it increases prices
and therefore the inflation rate. For corporations able to shift part
of the corporate tax back to labor in the form of reduced wages,
corporate tax increases should not alter product prices. More
likely, with the exception of corporations in regulated industries or
those enjoying monopoly or similar economic power to set prices,
the corporate tax is borne, at least in large part, by shareholders,
not shifted forward in product prices. In this situation, a corporate
tax rise should not increase product prices. The overall stabilizing
effect of the corporate income tax is difficult to evaluate but as-
suming that it is absorbed by shareholders, it probably is substan-
tially below that of the individual income tax, even with the cur-
rent two rate brackets.167
Payroll taxes have mixed effects on product prices. The em-
ployee's share of social security taxes can be expected to reduce his
take-home pay and, depending upon the monetary policy, may
tend to stabilize or reduce prices. In the short term, an increase in
the employer's share of social security taxes will increase business
costs and therefore product prices. However, in the long term, the
employer likely will shift this cost back to labor 168 and reduce the
product prices. Thus, increases in both the employer and em-
ployee's share of payroll taxes can be expected to have some stabi-
lizing effect on the economy. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Con-
gress would increase the taxable wage base or rate under the
167 Dividend policy does not respond quickly to changes in the level of after-tax profits.
To the extent that a reduction in after-tax profits eventually'will reduce dividend distribu-
tions, a corporate tax increase may reduce shareholders' disposable income, but probably
not enough to affect overall consumer demand and, consequently, consumer prices. Thus,
the corporate tax would not produce as quick a stabilizing effect on personal consumption
expenditures as the individual income tax, even if dividend cuts would affect product prices.
See R. Goode, supra note 157, at 277-280.
168 See Break, supra note 40, at 119, 168-175. According to Break, "[i]f the aggregate sup-
ply of labor is insensitive to wage rate changes, economists typically conclude that an em-
ployers' payroll tax will be completely shifted, and even for implausibly high labor supply
elasticities the unshifted portion is unlikely to exceed 20-25 percent." Id. at 174; see also De
Wulf, Taxation and Income Distribution, in Comparative Tax Studies: Essays in Honor of
Richard Goode 345, 354-355 (S. Cnossen ed. 1983).
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benefit-linked social security taxes in order to control inflation.
Increasing existing selective excise taxes may not serve to stabi-
lize prices. Most of these excise taxes are imposed on the selling
prices of taxed items, so that increases in excise taxes likely will
increase the prices of the taxed products and thereby may trigger
some reduction in overall consumer demand -by consumers of those
taxed products. 169 Excise tax increases may have other salutary ef-
fects. For example, an increase in the rates of existing excise taxes
(particularly on a temporary basis) may affect the timing of the
demand for those items and therefore may discourage attempts to
increase prices. 170 Ironically, if Congress were to consider a possible
increase in excise rates, due to the time lag between proposal and
effective date of the increase, the proposal actually may trigger ad-
ditional consumer demand 'before the rate hike takes effect.17 1
Enactment of a broad-based VAT can be expected to cause a
one-time increase in product prices17 1 for the taxed items by the
rate of the new tax.'7 In 1979 the United Kingdom shifted from
income taxation to VAT. As a result of this tax shift, the retail
price index substantially increased.1 7' As with excise taxes, a time
lag between enactment and effective date of a new VAT may in-
crease consumer demand for the period before the tax becomes
effective.
In summary, if Congress decides to increase revenue and wants
"' See Bailey, supra note 165, at 313.
370 See R. Goode, supra note 157, at 291.
7' See Munnell, supra note 154, at 359. A proposal to reduce rates may precipitate a drop
in the demand until the rate declines.
"72 A broad-based tax imposed equally on all units of production is more likely to be
shifted into product prices than taxes imposed only on selected items or only on one factor
of production such as profits. Kaldor states that "[a] general tax on sales of 10 per cent. will
always raise prices in relation to wages 10 per cent .. " 1 N. Kaldor, A Memorandum on
the Value-Added Tax, in Essays on Economic Policy 279 (1964).
... Product prices also may be influenced by monetary growth attendant to the enact-
ment of a broad-based sales or value added tax. However, the inflationary impact of the
monetary policy must be divorced from the impact of the tax policy. The former will not be
considered in detail in this article. See The President's Task Force on Business Taxation,
Business Taxation: The Report of the President's Task Force on Business Taxation 80
(1970) (minority views of Norman B. Ture) (hereinafter Business Taxation].
"' See A. Prest, Value Added Taxation: the Experience of the United Kingdom 11 (1980).
However, there were reports that some stores were absorbing part of the VAT increase.
"One econometric study suggests that only three-quarters of the VAT increase was likely to
be passed forward to consumers." Beenstock, Taxation and Incentives, 134 Lloyds Bank
Review 35, 35 (1979).
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the tax increase to serve to stabilize prices and control inflation (or
at least not create an inflationary effect), then it should not in-
crease revenue with a new VAT. Quite the contrary, a new VAT
likely will increase product prices more than increases in income or
payroll taxes, especially a progressive income tax.
2. Capital Formation and Savings (Economic Growth)
Increased individual savings and increased after-tax business
profits can promote economic growth by generating higher levels of
business investment and thus creating more jobs.'75 In part, it is
assumed that an increase in the rate of return on savings or invest-
ment will produce the economic growth. Conversely, it is claimed
that since a tax on savings or investment reduces the after-tax rate
of return, such a tax adversely affects economic growth. It is un-
clear if these assumptions remain valid today.'
A VAT ultimately is borne by consumers of taxed items.17 For
individuals choosing between current consumption and saving, the
enactment (or increase in rate) of a tax on consumption should
provide an incentive to defer consumption-in other words, it
should encourage savings." 8
Taxes imposed at the source of income and borne by individuals
reduce personal disposable income and therefore reduce funds
available either for savings or consumption. Tax changes or tax in-
centives that increase the rate of return on savings may not actu-
ally lead to increased savings for two reasons. 79 First, an abrupt
175 See J. Pechman, supra note 24, at 36.
176 See Sunley & Brannon, Direct Consumption Taxes: Value Added and Retail Sales, in
Tax Policy: New Directions and Possibilities 42 (Center for National Policy 1984); see also
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow, supra note 46, at 1173 (discussing a consumption tax's
effect on savings).
i77 Excise taxes also are borne by final consumers and would affect economic growth
much like a VAT.
78 R. Goode, supra note 157, at 74. For some income groups, an increase in excise or
other consumption taxes will alter savings, but not the level of consumption.
"' For example, the 1981 individual income tax reductions, including incentives for cer-
tain forms of savings, "were apparently allocated by households to consumption and saving
approximately in the proportions they had allocated their disposable income before." J.
Pechman, supra note 24, at 116; see also Pechman, supra note 49, at 1197 (arguing that the
decline in investments may be the result of uncertainty in payoff of investments rather than
a shortage of savings). Two economists have persuasively argued that income tax incentives
for savings under our previously highly progressive individual rate system would not have
been effective. See Galper & Steuerle, Tax Incentives for Saving, 2 Brookings Rev. 16
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increase in the level of savings may precipitate a drop in consumer
spending. The resulting decline in the domestic demand for goods
and services actually may reduce capital formation because it may
produce excess productive capacity. Second, individuals with low
income typically use all of their disposable income for consump-
tion. Tax reductions on returns on capital or tax incentives for sav-
ings would probably not affect the savings rate for this income
group. As disposable incomes rise above the level needed to
purchase necessities, individuals have discretionary income availa-
ble for additional consumption or for savings. Before the 1986 re-
forms, the progressive individual income tax took an increasing
share of discretionary income from higher income individuals.1 80
Thus, individuals more likely to save a larger proportion of their
incomes would have reduced levels of discretionary income availa-
ble for savings.
An increase in the corporate income tax may adversely affect
savings and economic growth. New investment in physical capital
comes mainly from individual and business savings or from bor-
rowing. Indeed, existing corporations finance a. large proportion of
new investment with after-tax corporate profits.181 Since tax borne
by business reduces after-tax profits, a corporate tax rise reduces
funds available for distribution to owners or for reinvestment in
business expansion.
Since the two-tier system of taxing corporations on their taxable
income and taxing shareholders on dividend income actually
reduces the rate of return on corporate investments, the corporate
tax may divert investment funds away from corporations to invest-
ment opportunities in the noncorporate sector that earn a higher
after-tax return. However, even if Congress integrated the corpo-
rate and individual income taxes or took other action to increase
the rate of return on corporate investments, these measures may
not promote business expansion or increase investment in the cor-
porate sector.1 82 With high rate corporate and individual income
taxes in effect before the 1986 reforms, Congress effectively used
(1983).
180 See supra note 3.
... See Subcomm. of the Special Comm. on Value Added Tax, ABA, Should The United
States Adopt The Value-Added Tax?-A Survey Of The Policy Considerations And The
Data Base, 26 Tax Lawyer 45, 64-65 (1972) [hereinafter Policy Considerations].
..2 See Pechman, supra note 49, at 1197.
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tax incentives to divert economic resources into socially or econom-
ically desirable investments. Like Joan of Flanders, who in 1224
encouraged migration of fifty weavers to Courtrai by exempting
them from the universal taille (property tax),"e' Congress en-
couraged capital formation with tax preferences such as the invest-
ment tax credit and accelerated depreciation for capital goods and
encouraged investment in social projects such as low-income hous-
ing with liberal depreciation deductions and other preferences.
Notwithstanding these incentives, management generally will rein-
vest business profits only if such internal expansion will provide a
better return than alternative investment opportunities. 184 In addi-
tion, with the 1986 tax reform that broadened the bases,' reduced
the rates under the income taxes,186 and restricted the use of cer-
tain tax exemptions and deductions, 87 Congress substantially re-
duced its ability to use tax preferences under the individual and
corporate income taxes to divert economic resources to invest-
ments that would promote economic growth.
Payroll tax increases are not likely to affect savings and capital
formation. Payroll taxes18 8 are imposed at the source of income
from labor and, for the employees' share, are withheld from wages.
In the long term, both the employer and employee's share of the
social security taxes probably will be borne by labor in the form of
reduced wages. They thus reduce funds available to the worker for
savings or consumption and therefore do not encourage either. So-
cial security taxes are proportional as to income, up to the wage
cap. The effective tax rate then declines as income exceeds the cap.
Since these taxes burden lower income taxpayers (not as likely to
183 See R. Cave & H. Coulson, A Source Book for Medieval Economic History 374 (1936).
184 Id.
'8 For example, the 1986 Act repealed the investment tax credit available under the 1954
Code. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211(a), 100 Stat. at 2166 (amend-
ing I.R.C. § 49(a)).
See I.R.C. § 1.
187 In the 1986 Act, Congress eliminated several tax incentives for savings. It eliminated
the capital gains preference applicable to gain on the sale of investments. See Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 100 Stat. at 2216-17 (repealing I.R.C. § 1202). Con-
gress also restricted the deductions for payments into Individual Retirement Accounts. See
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1101, 100 Stat. at 2411-14 (amending I.R.C.
§ 219).
18 For this purpose, the analysis is limited to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA) taxes which encompass the social security and hospital insurance that account for
most of the federal payroll taxes.
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save) more than higher income taxpayers (more likely to save), the
savings rate is not likely to change if the social security tax rate or
possibly even the base is increased."' 9
A VAT is preferable to existing federal taxes as a fiscal device to
encourage savings. Income taxes withdraw funds individuals would
otherwise use for consumption or savings. An income tax increase
therefore does not encourage savings. Since payroll taxes do not
directly burden income from savings or the use of savings for con-
sumption, they do not encourage either. On the other hand, if Con-
gress increased the cost to consume with a VAT (or to a lesser ex-
tent selective excise taxes), in effect, it may encourage taxpayers to
save rather than consume.
3. Equity or Fairness
One significant criterion used to measure the quality of a tax
system or a particular tax within the system is tax equity or fair-
ness. 190 Explaining the mission's recommended changes in the Jap-
anese tax system following World War II, Carl Shoup, head of the
American Tax Mission, noted that a nation's "tax system must sat-
isfy the deep, widespread feelings of the people as to what is
fair."'' He added that "no one remains in the tax field for long
without realizing that nothing he recommends will stand up unless
it meets the test of fairness in the distribution of the tax
burden."''
Two economic concepts traditionally have influenced our view of
,89 If Congress retained existing rates, but completely removed the cap on payroll taxes,
then such action would reduce funds available to higher income individuals possibly result-
ing in a reduction of personal savings.
'90 Distributional equity has been described as the method by which "economic resources
ought to be distributed in a fair society." Warren, supra note 5, at 1081-82. Distributional
equity of a tax may be tested either by the distribution of the tax burden or by the distribu-
tion of the benefits from the programs financed by the tax. According to Henry Aaron,
"[tihe most important question about a value-added tax concerns what its revenues are used
for." Aaron, The Value Added Tax: Some Lessons and Issues, 1 Brookings Review 4, 5
(1982). This article considers only the former.
'" See Gen. Headquarters, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Tokyo, 1 Report on
Japanese Taxation 17 (1949) (four volume report) [hereinafter Report of the Shoup Mis-
sion]. According to Richard and Peggy Musgrave, in their classic treatise on public finance,
one of the requirements for a "good" tax structure is that "[tihe distribution of the tax
burden should be equitable. Everyone should be made to pay his 'fair share'." P. Musgrave
& R. Musgrave, supra note 24, at 210.
" See 1 Report Of The Shoup Mission, supra note 191, at 16.
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distributive justice-the "benefit" and the "ability to pay" princi-
ples. Based on the benefit principle, each taxpayer should contrib-
ute to the revenue "in line with the benefits which he receives from
public services."' 93 A taxbased on the benefit principle may link
revenue to government expenditure policy; for example, highway
user taxes and tolls to fund the maintenance of roads, and to some
extent social security taxes to fund retirement and disability pro-
grams are taxes levied on the benefit principle. Taxes that fund
general government services such as defense cannot be explained
under the benefit principle. 19 Congress could levy a VAT to fi-
nance specific programs. For example, Congress considered the
possible adoption of a form of VAT to finance the Superfund to
clean up hazardous waste. However this article assumes that a
broad-based VAT will be enacted only if substantial revenue is
needed either to reduce the budget deficit or to finance general
government services. It therefore is more appropriate to judge
VAT by the ability to pay principle.
Three broad gauges may be used to measure individual ability to
pay taxes-income, consumption, or wealth'95 of a taxpayer or a
taxable unit. Since economic income equals the sum of consump-
tion, savings, and taxes, the basic difference between a tax based
on income and a tax based in consumption is that under the latter,
income not used for consumption is not taxed.'96 Wealth taxes
have been viewed as a possible supplementary index of ability to
pay, since income does not adequately take account of the fact that
wealth represents command over resources. 197 This article does not
compare VAT with a possible annual wealth tax.
In the United States, where the economic system distributes in-
come unequally and family responsibilities may affect ability to
pay taxes, the income tax tailored to individual differences may
193 P. Musgrave & R. Musgrave, supra note 24, at 211. "[B]enefit taxation, even at its
best, can relate only to the financing of public services and not to the redistributive function
of the tax-transfer process." Id. at 215.
IN See id. at 212-15.
19' Several European countries impose annual wealth taxes as well as estate or inheritance
taxes. The wealth tax typically is based 'on the value of assets, less liabilities, of the taxable
individual or taxable unit (household). See J. Pechman, supra note 24, at 245. Exemptions
remove all but the wealthy from the tax base. Id.
'" See Shoven & Taubman, Savings, Capital Income and Taxation, in The Economics of
Taxation, supra note 154, at 203, 206.
o See R. Goode, supra note 157, at 21.
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effectively distribute the tax burden in accordance with ability to
pay concepts.' A graduated consumption tax like an annual ex-
penditure tax also may distribute tax burdens in accordance with
taxpayers' ability to pay tax.'99
The "ability to pay" principle is subdivided into two elements of
distributive justice-horizontal and vertical equity.200 To achieve
horizontal equity, taxpayers situated equally should be taxed
equally.20 ' If income (what a taxpayer adds to community re-
sources) is viewed as an appropriate measure of ability to pay tax,
then taxpayers with equal incomes should be taxed equally. If con-
sumption (what the taxpayer withdraws from community resources
for personal use) is deemed an appropriate measure of ability to
pay, then taxpayers with equal levels of consumption should be
taxed equally.10 2 For this purpose, equity may be measured by in-
dividuals' lifetime or annual consumption. °3 In this section, how-
ever it is assumed that annual income is a better yardstick of abil-
ity to pay taxes.20 4
Vertical equity assumes that the tax burden should be progres-
sive as to income. For many years, the federal tax system relied on
steeply progressive individual income tax rates to implement our
concept of vertical equity. However, since the early 1960s, Con-
gress has cut the top individual tax rate from ninety-one percent
to twenty-eight percent.20 5 Judged by traditional support for a pro-
gressive federal tax system, the VAT is not as equitable as progres-
,98 See J. Pechman, supra note 24, at 60.
'" See id. at 73.
20 See P. Musgrave & R. Musgrave, supra note 24, at 215-24.
2, The measurement of horizontal equity also depends in part upon the definition of the
taxable unit; that is, should equity be based on individual or household income, or each?
Second, it is unclear if the appropriate measuring rod is taxable income, economic income or
some other standard. See, e.g., Shoven & Taubman, supra note 196, at 205.
202 See Hobbes, supra note 45 at 184; see also Bradford & Toder, Consumption vs. Income
Base Taxes: The Argument on Grounds of Equity and Simplicity, 1976 Proc. of 69th Ann.
Conf. on Tax'n of Nat'l Tax Ass'n 25, 29.
203 See Bradford & Toder, supra note 202, at 30.
20 Typically, a tax period of one year is used to judge equity in the distribution of the tax
burden of a particular tax. See id. at 30-31. But see J. Pechman & B. Okner, Who Bears the
Tax Burden 52 (1974) (arguing that family economic decisions, such as housing and other
consumption choices, tend to made on the basis of expected income over a period of years,
and thus "[e]ffective rates of tax based on income for a single year may not be representa-
tive of the tax burdens of families with unusually low (or high) incomes").
20' Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1 (1954) (maximum income tax rate of 91%) with
I.R.C. § 1 (maximum income tax rate of 28%).
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sive income taxes. However, consider (1) the recent dramatic re-
duction both in the number of brackets and the top rate for the
individual income tax, resulting in mildly progressive rates for tax-
payers remaining in the tax system; (2) the reduced rate corporate
income taxes; and (3) the flat-rate payroll taxes. In light of this
new federal tax structure, it is no longer clear that Congress and
the taxpaying population would view a single rate, broad-based
VAT as providing an "inequitable" distribution of the tax burden.
Broad-based sales taxes are considered regressive because they
impose a higher tax burden, as a percentage of income, on lower
income groups (especially those below the poverty level) than on
higher income groups. But there are two points worth noting. First,
there is some evidence that a VAT burden is proportional to in-
come, rather than regressive. 0 6 Second, the regressivity of one tax
may be accommodated by making adjustments in the progressive
taxes if, as a result, the overall federal system possesses an accept-
able degree of progressivity.
The Treasury Department, in its 1984 report on tax reform,2"7
discussed the concept of progressive and regressive taxes. It sug-
gested that there are two equity issues that affect taxes like sales
tax or VAT-the regressivity of the tax and the absolute burden of
the tax on the poor.2"' Congress can reduce the regressivity of a
VAT by granting tax preferences on necessities that account for
most or all of the consumption by lower income taxpayers. How-
ever, it would be more difficult for Congress to offset the absolute
burden of a VAT on the poor, unless Congress grants a refundable
tax credit or reduces other taxes that they now pay. With the
movement to reduce the number of return-filing taxpayers (indi-
vidual income tax returns), 0 9 it is less likely that Congress would
offset the burden of a VAT on the poor through refundable credits
obtained by filing returns.
Based on principles of horizontal and vertical equity and using
income as the standard by which equity principles are measured,
VAT does not fare as well as income and payroll taxes. Testing for
,I" Pohmer, Germany, in The Value Added Tax: Lessons from Europe, supra note 83, at
96-97.
207 See supra note 1.
208 3 Treasury Proposal, supra note 1, at 43.
209 See I Treasury Proposal, supra note 1, at 5.
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horizontal equity, the individual income tax scores well. By tailor-
ing the tax to individual circumstances, Congress can tax those
with equal taxable incomes equally. 10 Assuming that the corporate
tax is borne by shareholders, the corporate tax does not meet the
standards of horizontal equity. At various levels of individual in-
come, stock ownership, as well as dividend policy among corpora-
tions, vary widely. Assuming that the employer's and employee's
share of social security taxes are borne by labor, the payroll taxes
deviate somewhat from the standard of horizontal equity. Since
they are imposed only on taxable wages, a retired person earning
$25,000 income exclusively from social security benefits and from
savings is not subject to the social security taxes, while a worker
with $25,000 income earned exclusively from wages would be sub-
ject to this tax.211 Testing for horizontal equity, VAT ranks quite
low. At the low and middle income ranges, because taxpayers
spend most or all of their disposable income on consumption, there
is a significant correlation between income and consumption. This
is not true at higher income levels, and even within other ranges,
taxpayers have different kinds and amounts of consumption ex-
penditures. Selective excise taxes are worse than a broad-based
VAT. There are wide variations in the excise tax burden for indi-
viduals at any given level of income because it is totally dependent
upon their level of consumption of the taxed items.
A progressive individual income tax can be designed to achieve
vertical equity. Before the 1986 reforms, the tax rates for individu-
als were progressive as to income, taxing high income individuals
or family groups at higher effective tax rates than those earning
lower levels of income. The 1986 Act reduced to two the number of
tax rate brackets. Consequently, Congress has dramatically re-
duced the structural progressivity in the individual income tax.
When the corporate income tax is borne by shareholders, then
within the limits of a two rate individual income tax system, the
corporate tax is somewhat progressive as to income because data
indicates that income from capital, including dividend income, in-
2' However, see the various tax rate schedules for various categories of taxpayers, such as
unmarried individuals, married couples, and heads of household in § 1. See I.R.C. § 1.
" Even if the employer's share of social security taxes is shifted to consumers, the tax
does not meet the standards of horizontal equity because it will be borne in relation to
consumption of goods and services and thus may not bear any direct relationship to the
consumers' incomes.
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creases as individual income rises. 12 If social security taxes ulti-
mately are borne by labor, then up to the wage cap, it is propor-
tional to wage income. As the ratio of wages subject to social
security taxes to total income declines (especially when wage in-
come exceeds the ceiling), social security taxes become decidedly
regressive as to income.213 To the extent that business considers
social security taxes as costs to be shifted into product prices then,
like excises and VAT, they are regressive as to income.
Selective federal excise taxes and VAT do not fare well when
tested by a traditional view of vertical equity, at least when mea-
sured annually rather than over a lifetime. Excises on items like
alcohol and tobacco tend to be regressive as to income because
consumption of these items represents a decreasing proportion of
income as annual income increases.2" If a consumption tax like a
VAT has a broad base, it may, at best, be proportional as to con-
sumption. However, the proportion of income used for consump-
tion tends to decline as individual or household income increases.
Thus, even if basic necessities are exempt from tax, a VAT or
other general consumption tax likely will not become progressive
as to income.
Some commentators have suggested that an analysis of equity in
the distribution of the tax burden must consider not only the inci-
dence of the tax imposed, but also the distribution of benefits fi-
nanced by the tax.2" 5 However, this approach conflicts with the fo-
cus of an ability to pay analysis. If (1) it is desirable that lower
income families receive benefits that outweigh their tax burden
and (2) ability to pay taxes is the appropriate standard, then a
VAT is less desirable as a funding source for social welfare pro-
grams than income taxes.216
See J. Pechman, supra note 24, at 140.
213 See id. at 212.
24 Id. at 192. Consumption is a declining percentage of income once disposable income
exceeds the amount required to obtain necessities. The data supporting the regressivity of
consumption taxes is based on the ratio of annual consumption to annual income. If lifetime
consumption and lifetime income are the barometers, then the consumption tax still may be
regressive, but less so. For a discussion of this issue as it pertains to a consumption-style
personal income tax, see Andrews, supra note 46, at 1174-75.
," See J. Bickley, National Sales Tax: Selected Policy Issues 35 (1984); W. Sher & R.
Pinola, Microeconomic Theory 735 (1981); Aaron, supra note 83, at 4-5.
216 J. Bickley, supra note 215, at 35. As part of the analysis of the ratio of income to tax,
arguably, the benefits received from the new revenue source should be included as part of
[Vol. 7:207
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Based on traditional views about horizontal and vertical equity,
a progressive rate individual income tax permits the most equita-
ble distribution of tax burden, with corporate income and payroll
taxes less desirable but better than selective excise taxes. A VAT
would rank higher than selective excises, would be difficult to com-
pare with social security taxes, and would be decidedly worse than
corporate and individual income taxes. However, while it is too
early to make a definitive judgment, in light of the 1986 reforms
that dramatically reduced the top corporate and individual income
tax rates, and reduced to two the number of individual tax rate
brackets, it is possible that taxpayers collectively have changed our
concept of vertical equity and no longer consider highly progressive
taxes essential to achieve an equitable distribution of the federal
tax burden. If so, then a VAT may not rank so poorly, based on
ability to pay principles.
4. Neutrality or Economic Efficiency
A common tax policy goal is to develop a tax system that fosters
economic efficiency or neutrality. 17 A tax is economically efficient
if it does not distort economic behavior; that is, the tax is neutral
as to:
(1) a business' choice among various forms of operation;
(2) a consumer's choice among possible consumption expend-
itures;
(3) an individual's choice between consuming now or saving for
future consumption; and
(4) an individual's choice between working or preferring lei-
julsure.218
If Congress considered increasing the existing income-based in-
dividual income tax or enacting a broad-based C-style VAT and
neither choice would change relative prices of goods or services,
then these alternatives would be neutral as to consumers' choices
among consumer items. However, if the VAT were riddled with ex-
emptions or other preferences, it would not foster economic effi-
ciency. Such a VAT would distort choices consumers must make
between taxable and tax-preferred consumption items. Similar
the individual or family income, even if it is not subject to income tax.
217 See McLure, Jr., supra note 51, at 121.
18 J. Bickley, supra note 215, at 25-26.
19871 273
Virginia Tax Review
inefficiency would occur if Congress increased the income tax that
incorporated preferences for the consumption of certain goods or
services.21
Whether or not increases in individual income tax or VAT
change relative prices, these tax increases may create other distor-
tions. Compared with a new broad-based VAT, an increase in a
progressive individual income tax may distort choices individuals
make between current and future consumption or between work
and leisure. With the 1986 base broadening and rate reducing re-
forms, these distortions under the individual income tax have been
reduced substantially. However, if the new VAT included a sub-
stantial number of "item" preferences, the resulting VAT may dis-
tort an individual's decision to consume now or save to consume in
the future (the incentive to consume exempt items currently may
distort this choice), but to the extent of the preferences, it may be
neutral as to an individual's decision to work or prefer leisure,
since neither labor income used to consume exempt goods nor the
value of leisure would be subject to a VAT.220
The corporate income tax is not a neutral tax because it distorts
a business' choice of form of operation. The two tier system of tax-
ing business profits at the corporate level and taxing dividend in-
come at the shareholder level affects the choice between operating
a business in corporate versus noncorporate form. 2 ' The separate
corporate level tax also may create differences in relative prices of
items produced by corporate and unincorporated firms.222 Since a
business can reduce its corporate tax by paying interest on debt,
but not by paying dividends on equity, the corporate tax distorts
the choice between debt and equity financing for business opera-
tions. Finally, the 1986 base-broadening and rate-reducing reforms
left the corporate top rate above the individual top rate, further
discouraging operation as a taxpaying corporation.223
It has been asserted that the corporate tax may serve as an um-
brella to protect inefficient corporations that otherwise could not
" For example, the existing individual income tax exempts health and accident insur-
ance provided by employers from taxation, thus encouraging workers to take part of their
wages in this tax-free form.
220 J. Bickley, supra note 215, at 26.
' See McLure, Jr., supra note 51, at 173.
222 Id.
123 See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11.
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compete with profitable taxpaying corporations.224 To the extent
that industry leaders are able to shift part of the corporate tax
forward into product prices, this price increase permits the more
inefficient corporations to compete with the price setting leaders
and thereby remain in business despite their inefficiency. For ex-
ample, assume the price setting (PS) Corporation shifts its corpo-
rate tax (amounting to about $.50 per widget) into the $10.50 price
for widgets. An inefficient, competing (IC) Corporation has higher
production costs, but still can obtain customers for its widgets if it
sells them for not more than $10.50 per unit. At this price, the IC
Corporation earns no profit and therefore pays no corporate tax. If
the corporate tax were replaced with a VAT, PS Corporation could
sell at a pre-VAT ten dollar price and add a VAT on the sale. At
this ten dollar pre-tax price, the IC Corporation would sustain
losses of $.50 per unit and ultimately may close. Over time, if the
corporate tax is shifted, the replacement of the corporate tax with
a VAT can be expected to drive the inefficient corporations out of
business. However, it is not clear that Congress supports a national
goal of promoting economic efficiency in business, if it occurs at
the cost of insolvency for marginal businesses.22 5 Indeed, new busi-
nesses typically are not very efficient during their formative years
and national policy promotes capital formation for new enterprises
to hire additional workers. The replacement of most or all of the
corporate tax with a VAT could produce a federal tax structure
that distorts economic decisions on the form of business operation
if corporations could become tax shelters for owners to accumulate
earnings and avoid the shareholder level tax. However, if Congress
coupled the adoption of a VAT with the integration of the individ-
ual and corporate income taxes, the tax shelter phenomenon could
be avoided.
Payroll taxes are imposed on wages up to a statutory ceiling for
covered employees and self-employed individuals and, as taxes
withheld from wages, are neutral as to individuals' choices among
consumer items and as to individuals' choices between current con-
sumption and savings for future consumption. Since they are im-
... See Business Taxation, supra note 173, at 65.
""' For example, Congress helped the ailing, unprofitable Chrysler Corporation rather
than permit it to terminate its domestic manufacturing operations. See Chrysler Corp. Loan
Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, §§1-18, 93 Stat. 1324, 1324-36.
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posed on wages up to a statutory ceiling, payroll taxes may create
individual preferences for leisure over work until the ceiling is
reached; they then do not distort this choice, since they then do
not tax either work or leisure. A broad-based VAT does not have
any significant efficiency or neutrality advantages over existing
payroll taxes, except as to the latter's preference for leisure over
work at payroll levels below the statutory cap.22
5. VAT as a Fiscal Tool to Promote Economic Goals
The focus of the 1986 tax reforms was to broaden the base and
reduce the top rates for the individual and corporate income taxes.
In the process, Congress reduced the role of income taxes in affect-
ing economic or industrial policy. For example, Congress reversed
prior tax policy that encouraged the modernization of plants and
equipment with the investment tax credit and rapid depreciation,
and that had encouraged the investment in research and develop-
ment and in certain kinds of real estate. It would be ironic if Con-
gress now found VAT attractive as a fiscal tool to promote eco-
nomic or industrial policy goals. Yet, a VAT can be used as a fiscal
tool to affect the economy in very discreet ways.22
If Congress enacted a VAT and granted the President the power
to alter the VAT rates within a prescribed range (to alter a ten
percent VAT rate by twenty percent-up to twelve percent or
down to eight percent), then the government may be able to in-
crease the VAT rate to reduce consumption and thereby slow down
an overheated economy or may reduce the VAT rate to stimulate a
stagnant economy. If Congress retained the power to make these
modest short term rate changes, they may be less effective as a
fiscal tool. While Congress debated a bill to increase the rate to
stifle consumption, consumers could accelerate their purchases to
avoid the proposed increase. Likewise, if Congress wanted to cut
the VAT rate temporarily to stimulate consumer spending, the
normal tax legislative process might delay enactment of the tax cut
until it was no longer needed.
Congress could alter VAT rates on selected consumer items to
stimulate or dampen demand in particular industries or particular
226 See generally McLure, Jr., supra note 51, at 174.
227 It is assumed here that the VAT would be an invoice method tax which would be
shifted to consumers in the form of higher prices for taxable items.
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segments of the economy. For example, to reverse a recession in
the auto industry, Congress or the President (if the latter is
granted power to adjust rates) could stimulate car buying by cut-
ting the VAT rate on automobiles for a limited period of time.
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of a VAT as a fiscal tool to
achieve economic, social, or other national policy goals, it would be
undesirable to enact a new VAT to serve these functions rather
than to serve basically as a revenue raising measure. 128 If the fed-
eral government wants to stimulate or dampen the economy, it
may find that it would be more effective to rely on monetary than
fiscal policy. Congress cannot justify adoption of a broad-based
federal tax on consumption just to obtain this potential fiscal tool.
On balance, the economic considerations discussed do not favor
the use of a VAT as a fiscal tool. Instead, reliance on existing fed-
eral income and payroll taxes is a better course, and a VAT should
be considered only as a revenue raising measure.
D. Impact of VAT on International Trade
In the 1980s, the United States' balance of trade deteriorated
substantially.22 For 1986, exports were $376.2 billion, or 8.9% of
GNP, imports were $481.7 billion, and the net of imports over ex-
ports were $105.5 billion (2.5% of GNP).
The United States and most of its trading partners2 3 collectively
have limited their ability to use tax preferences to stimulate export
trade. Parties bound by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) 31 can exempt exports from their indirect taxes like
VAT, but may not exempt exports from their income, payroll, and
other direct taxes.232
228 See McLure, Jr., The Value-Added Tax: Effects on Productivity and Equity, 20 Tax
Notes 971, 976 (Sept. 26, 1983).
2 See supra p. 236, Table 6 for 1982 data. In 1983, the United States registered a $6.1
billion deficit. Commerce Survey, supra note 130, at 20, Table 1.1. It grew to $58.9 billion in
1984 and to $79.2 billion by 1985. Id.
30 Most of the countries in the free world, accounting for about 80% of world trade,
adhere to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See International Trade
Agreements, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 75:0101, IA (1985).
231 The United States agreed to adhere to GATT, effective January 1, 1948, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700. GATT was amended as part of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, § 2, 93 Stat. 144, 147-48.
22 Art. XVI(4) of GATT provides, in pertinent part, that:
[Clontracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of
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In addition to affecting international trade through border tax
adjustments (imposing tax on imports and providing rebates for
tax on exports), a nation may make its products more attractive in
the international marketplace by adjusting the value of its cur-
rency. However, the United States and other nations bound by the
rules of the Internal Monetary Fund cannot freely adjust their cur-
rency exchange rates.2 33 Indeed, as discussed below, the United
States has even less flexibility than most of its major trading part-
ners to use dollar exchange rate changes to alter its balance of
trade position.
With floating exchange rates, a nation's imbalance (surplus or
deficit) in its balance of trade position ultimately should be
brought into balance. However, balance of trade is only one factor
in a nation's balance of payments. In addition, since the dollar
serves not only as a medium of payment for the United States, but
also as an international currency, the value of the dollar is not as
responsive as many other floating currencies to trade or balance of
payments imbalances. Further, some of our trading partners, such
as Taiwan and South Korea, traditionally linked the value of their
subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy
results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable
price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market.
GATT, March 10, 1955, Ad. Art. XVI(4), 8 U.S.T. 1767, 1777, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, at 11, 278
U.N.T.S. 168, 184.
Moreover, according to GATT, "[t]he exemption of an exported product from duties on
taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission
of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be
deemed to be a subsidy." Id. at Annex I, Ad. Article XVI, 8 U.S.T. at 1798-99, T.I.A.S. No.
3930, at 33, 278 U.N.T.S. at 218. Thus, a contracting party to GATT can exempt exports
from VAT, since it is borne by domestic consumption, but it cannot exempt exports from
income or payroll taxes, since it is not feasible for a nation to identify the extent to which
these taxes are included in the prices of like products sold domestically.
.33 The United States and other members of the International Monetary Fund undertake
"to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements
and to promote a stable system of exchange rates." Second Amendment to the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 5 April 30, 1976, Art. I, 29 U.S.T. 2203,
2205, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 2. Further, they agree to "avoid manipulating exchange rates or
the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjust-
ment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members .. " Id. at Art. I(iii),
29 U.S.T. at 2205, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 2. Professor Surrey suggested that, without enacting
a federal VAT, the United States may have been able to justify low rate border tax adjust-
ments consistent with GATT. See A Review of Balance of Payment Policies: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess 45 (1969) (statement of Stanley S. Surrey)
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currencies to the value of the dollar.234 Trade imbalances with
these trading partners have not self-corrected even if there was a
change in the value of the dollar.236 Thus, it is not surprising that
even though the value of the dollar fluctuated dramatically from
1983 to 1986, the United States suffered a chronic balance of trade
deficit.236
If chronic deficits in the United States' balance of trade reduce
domestic employment and GNP significantly, Congress may decide
that it is necessary to change domestic policies, including federal
tax policy, in order to promote export trade. A nation can improve
its balance of trade by stimulating exports or discouraging imports.
It may focus on the price of its exports in the international mar-
ketplace and the price of imports in its domestic market. Fiscal
and monetary policies as well as targeted programs then may be
adopted to alter the level of imports or exports. Alternatively, the
government may attempt to improve the balance of trade by im-
posing customs duties, VAT, or another indirect tax on imports
and by rebating the VAT or other indirect tax on exports. The
government could also encourage exports by providing low-interest
rates to finance these sales, providing foreign marketing assistance,
or, in other ways, providing funds to reduce exporters' costs and
thereby, indirectly, permitting exporters to reduce their export
prices.
Under the existing federal tax system, value that is added in the
United States to exports, imports, and domestically-produced and
consumed goods and services is subject to income and payroll
taxes. However, value added outside the United States to imported
goods and services is not subject to these taxes, but bear only cus-
toms duties.23 If instead of increasing income or payroll taxes,
Congress enacted a destination principle VAT with border tax ad-
justments, the effect would be to relinquish tax jurisdiction over
the value added to exports and, in its place, tax value that is added
to imports outside the United States. 238 Thus, during years like
34 Leung, Taiwan Comes Under Fire for Pushing its Currency up Against the U.S. Dollar,
Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1987, at 27, col 2.
235 Id.
131 Commerce Survey, supra note 130, at 20, Table 1.1.
237 Both imports and domestically produced goods must bear federal excise taxes.
238 Congress relinquished jurisdiction to impose the full corporate income tax on some
export profits. See I.R.C. §§ 921-26, 991-99. With the current balance of trade deficits, there
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1986, when imports outstripped exports by over $105 billion, the
Treasury would receive a fiscal dividend based on the excess of the
tax imposed on imports over the tax rebated on exports.
Can reliance on VAT rather than direct income and payroll
taxes improve our balance of trade? In part, it depends upon
whether relative prices of American exports will be lower if the
United States reduces its traditional reliance on direct taxes in
favor of a VAT. The impact of various taxes on relative prices de-
pends both upon the extent to which the alternative taxes are
shifted into prices of goods and services and to which they affect
inflation.2 3 9 For this purpose, it is assumed that a corporate or in-
dividual income tax hike would not be shifted to consumers by
businesses subject to these taxes. In contrast, if the new VAT is
enacted to raise total federal revenue and the Federal Reserve ac-
commodates the new VAT with an increase in the money supply, it
is reasonable to assume that the VAT will be shifted to consumers.
However, with border tax adjustments, the new VAT should not
alter the relative prices of domestically produced and' imported
goods.24 0 In fact, coupling the price increases resulting from VAT
with the VAT rebate for exports, export prices should remain at
their pre-VAT levels.24 Given these assumptions on shifting, 2 a
VAT with border tax adjustments likely will not alter the balance
of trade if it is enacted in lieu of an increase in individual or corpo-
rate income taxes. 43
In contrast to the above assumptions, here it is assumed that a
new VAT is enacted in lieu of increases in taxes, such as payroll
taxes, that are considered product costs and shifted to consum-
ers.14 4 With these assumptions, it is likely that the tax shift will
should be some net revenue gain if VAT were substituted for some income and payroll
taxes.
23" See supra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
240 Brannon, supra note 117, at 1389.
Id. at 1388-89.
242 Basically, the assumptions in the text are similar to the conclusions reached earlier in
this article. See supra notes 157-74 and accompanying text; see also Brannon supra note
117, at 1388-89 (making the same assumptions)
113 See Brannon, supra note 117, at 1389; see also McLure Jr., supra note 228, at 974-75
(expressly rejecting the argument that border tax adjustments that accompany a VAT are
the equivalents to import duties and export rebates).
2' See Brannon, supra note 117, at 1389. This assumption conflicts with the assumption
earlier in the article that payroll taxes, in the long term, are borne by labor.
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encourage exports and discourage imports. Indeed, if a new VAT
financed cuts in payroll taxes, the benefit to exports should be
more visible. The payroll tax cuts should reduce prices of goods
and the VAT border tax adjustments should leave the exports free
of VAT, permitting exporters to pass the price reductions induced
by the reduced payroll tax on to foreign buyers. However, Ameri-
can trading partners may charge that if the United States replaced
payroll taxes with a border adjusted VAT, the border adjustments
would violate its obligation under GATT24 5 and, if the switch had a
significant effect on American exports, may support retaliatory ac-
tion by them. While replacement of some payroll taxes with a
VAT, rebatable on exports, may improve the short-term balance of
trade, with floating exchange rates and possible retaliatory action
under GATT, it is doubtful such a shift would correct the chronic
balance of trade deficits.2 4
E. Tax Administration and Taxpayer Compliance
1. Taxpayers' Attitudes Towards Existing Taxes
In the Middle Ages, taxation was perceived as a liberating tool.
During the reign of Philip IV, individuals could pay a tax in order
to gain exemption from military service.2 47 Cities and towns could
make payments to rulers "in lieu" of their obligations to house and
feed the armies.2 4s Today, it is difficult to identify a tax that is
perceived by taxpayers as a "good tax." Thus, in a contest for fa-
vorite taxes, the debate centers on which tax is the least
objectionable.
An individual's perception of an entire tax system may depend
on his view of how taxes burden him. Attitudes toward a particular
tax also may Vary, depending upon whether it is viewed as a tax
borne by business or a tax shifted to consumers. A taxpayer's pref-
erence for an income- or consumption-based tax also may be
colored by whether he views an individual's welfare as "best mea-
sured by standard of living (usually identified with consumption)
2,5 See supra note 231.
'" See Business Taxation, supra note 173, at 68-69. If the value of a VAT to influence
balance of trade was too problematic in 1970, when there were fixed currency exchange
rates, it would be even more problematic with the existing system of floating exchange rates.
7 J. Strayer & C. Taylor, Studies in Early French Taxation 56-57 (1939).
248 G. Ardant, Theorie Sociologique de l'Impot 49-50 (1965).
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or ability to pay (usually identified with income)."2" 9
The most comparable existing tax to a VAT is the state sales
tax. Repeatedly, taxpayer opinion polls have indicated that state
sales taxes rank as one of the least offensive forms of taxation.50
In spite of the regressive effects of most broad-based sales taxes
and the fact that the federal government traditionally relied on
progressive income taxes to raise a large proportion of federal reve-
nue, the public opinion polls indicate that taxpayers apparently
view as fair the pay-as-you-consume retail sales tax levied on all
consumers of taxed goods.25' Taxpayers may prefer a sales tax paid
in small increments to an income tax withheld in large amounts25 2
because they see their income tax withholding listed on their year-
end W-2 forms and their total income tax liability.on their annual
tax returns, while most taxpayers do not keep account of their to-
tal sales tax payments. Some favor the sales tax because' it is per-
ceived as a tax paid by everyone, including wealthy individuals
who may be able to minimize their income tax liability by invest-
ing in tax-preferred investments.2 5 Notwithstanding the above, it
is difficult to obtain a fair comparison of taxpayer attitudes toward
federal income taxes and state and local sales taxes, since the aver-
age family's income tax burden outstrips its sales tax burden by
about ten to one. 5 4 Interestingly, taxpayers do not seem to prefer
state sales taxes over state income taxes, even though, between the
two, the average taxpayer bears a heavier state income tax bur-
249 Bradford & Toder, supra note 202, at 25. In their article, Bradford and Toder argue
that if a lifetime perspective is used, consumption is superior to income as a measure of
ability to pay. Id. at 30.
'60 See, e.g., Advisory Comm. on Intergovernmental Relations, Changing Public Attitude
on Governments and Taxes 1 (1986). To put the 1986 poll into perspective, 37% of those
polled chose the federal income tax as the worst tax, 28% chose the local property tax, while
17% chose state sales tax and eight percent chose the state income tax. Id.
251 A 1981 analysis of "tax surveys" indicates that Americans tend to prefer state and
local taxes over federal taxes. Harstad, Interpreting Americans' Attitudes Toward Taxes, 13
Tax Notes 1083, 1098 (November 9, 1981). For example, surveys indicate that Americans
prefer state income taxes over federal income taxes. Id.; see also J. Bickley, supra note 215,
at 21-23 (noting that the federal income tax has ranked as the worst and least fair tax for
the past eight years).
'51 Harstad, supra note 251, at 1098.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 1099. Consistent with their self interest, low income individuals who pay little or
no income tax, but pay sales taxes, tend to be critical of the sales tax, while high income
individuals who tend to pay proportionately lower sales taxes tend to favor them. Id.
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den.2 56 Finally, an analysis of tax surveys concludes that "survey
comparisons between the federal income tax and the state sales tax
have so many inherent biases as to defy any reliable conclusion
about a public preference for income versus consumption
taxation."2 56
The public's relatively positive view of state sales taxes may not
translate into public enthusiasm for a federal VAT. Assuming the
choice to raise revenue is between adopting a national sales tax or
increasing the individual income tax, in a 1983 survey, Americans
favored a national sales tax.257 However, in an earlier 1979 survey,
taxpayers opposed the substitution of a VAT for existing federal
taxes by approximately five to one.258
2. Compliance and the Underground Economy
Historically, the United States has a higher level of voluntary
taxpayer compliance2 59 and lower tax collection costs .than the
other Western industrialized nations. Nevertheless, it is estimated
that there is a multibillion dollar underground economy which op-
erates outside the existing federal income tax system. Some work-
ers who receive cash for services and some persons who sell goods
or render services do not report their income or gain from these
transactions. In 1979, then Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Jerome Kurtz reported that for 1976, individuals failed to report
$75 to $100 billion of income from legal sources and another $25 to
$35 billion of income from criminal activities,"' resulting in a total
estimated revenue loss of $19 to $26 billion.26' In that year, re-
255 Id.
2:' Id. at 1098.
257 J. Bickley, supra note 215, at 21-23.
258 Harstad, supra note 251, at 1100.
259 Noncompliance generally includes failure to file returns, filing inaccurate returns, or
failing to pay the tax reported on filed returns. See Research Div., Office of the Assistant
Comm'r for Planning, Fin. & Research, Internal Revenue Service, Income Tax Compliance
Research: Estimates for 1973-1981 19 (1983) [hereinafter Income Tax Compliance
Research].
280 Internal Revenue Service, Estimates of Income Unreported in Individual Income Tax
Returns at ii (1979) [hereinafter Estimates of Income Unreported].
281 Underground Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1979) (Statement of Hon. Jerome
Kurtz, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service) [hereinafter Underground Economy].
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ported income totaled $1.073 trillion.262 Thus, about eighty-nine
percent of the estimated $1.208 trillion of reportable income was
reported.26 3 These estimates place unreported income at under
four percent of GNP. Projecting from this earlier data, the Internal
Revenue Service estimated that the "tax gap" rose to $81.5 billion
in lost revenue by 1981, with about ninety-two percent attributable
to individuals.2 " The Service also estimated that, during this pe-
riod, voluntary compliance declined further.265 Even though there
was only a small percentage drop in compliance, it is significant,
both because it reflects a trend toward increased noncompliance
and because the dollar increase in lost revenue is so large.2 6
One estimate of noncompliance places the tax gap at about 7.5%
of GNP.267 While, when measured by American expectations, this
level of noncompliance is high, it likely is lower than the level of
cheating that is the norm in most other countries.6 s It is not clear
if noncompliance actually has increased in recent years or if the
1979 study (or its progeny) merely has documented the level of
noncompliance that previously existed.
One goal of tax reform is to reduce the rates at which existing
taxes are levied and to impose any new tax at the lowest possible
rate. Taxpayers likely pay, and thus the Service can collect, more
easily, taxes levied at lower rates. As tax rates increase, taxpayers
find it more profitable to evade the high rate tax. Thus, it was
predictable that the level of tax cheating in the United States
262 Id.
20 Some commentators have criticized the Service estimates. For example, Dr. David M.
O'Neill of the U.S. Bureau of the Census estimates that the tax gap was about 7.5% in 1981,
not the Service's estimate of 3.4% of GNP. See Staff of the Joint Economic Comm., 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., Growth of the Underground Economy, 1950-81: Some Evidence from the
Current Population Survey 14 (Joint Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter Growth of the Under-
ground Economy].
204 See Income Tax Compliance Research , supra note 259, at 2, 7. The estimated revenue
loss from selected illegal activities was about $9 billion. Id. at 2. The Service recognizes that
these estimates of the "tax gap" are subject to substantial limitations. It cannot accurately
estimate the loss in revenue: (1) resulting from transfers of funds to tax haven countries,
and (2) resulting from income earned "on the side." Id. at 15.; see also infra notes 275-79
and accompanying text.
10 See Income Tax Compliance Research, supra note 259, at 11.
26 Id.
207 See Growth of the Underground Economy, supra note 263; at 14.
20 See Underground Economy, supra note 261, at 212-14 (statement of Mr. Jeffrey
Nichols).
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would increase when, in the 1970s, inflation pushed taxpayers into
higher tax rate brackets under our progressive individual income
tax structure. As publicity about tax cheating in the United States
increased, taxpayers confidence in the fairness of the federal in-
come tax deteriorated. Indeed, this perception of unfairness served
as part of the justification for the 1986 base broadening, rate re-
ducing reforms that resulted in a two rate individual income tax
system with a top rate of twenty-eight percent."" Nevertheless, it
is not so clear that cuts in tax rates, by themselves, increase com-
pliance with the lower rate tax. The 1986 reforms represent the
only American experience with a dramatic decline in federal in-
come or payroll tax rates in recent memory. It will take some years
before data can document whether these rate cuts actually increase
tax compliance.
3. Comparison of Noncompliance Under an Income Tax and
VAT
It is commonly assumed that a substantial part of individual in-
come tax evasion is attributable to sales by informal vendors.Y
Actually, these sales of $17 billion represent only about 6.8% of
the 1981 total unreported legal source income under the individual
income tax, and most of this noncompliance arose from home re-
pairs, food, child care, domestic services, auto repair, sidewalk ven-
dor sales, flea market goods, and lawn maintenance2 1 The above
estimates may not accurately reflect moonlighting that is per-
formed for businesses that report their legal source income. The
Service's report on taxpayer compliance acknowledged the diffi-
culty that researchers have in measuring "off the books wages and
informal supplier earnings. "272 Yet, this report discounted claims
that there has been a dramatic growth in the "underground econ-
omy,' 2 7 3 stating that "[T]hese claims have been supported with in-
direct, circumstantial evidence, anecdotes, and theoretical argu-
'' See I.R.C. § 1.
Informal vendors generally are those who can sell goods or perform services as sole
proprietors alone or with only a few employees.
..1 Income Tax Compliance Research, supra note 259, at 101, Table D-2.
.. See id. at 15.
... Tax noncompliance is much broader than the popular term, "underground economy."
For example, unreported interest received on savings accounts is part of the "tax gap," but
is not considered "underground" income. See id. at 6.
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ments. Direct empirical evidence to support the thesis of a thriving
'underground economy' in the United States, however, has not
been forthcoming. 27
4
The Europeans touted the VAT as a tax that would increase tax-
payer compliance. The European-style invoice method VAT uses
the seller's tax invoice as part of its self-policing mechanism. The
business purchaser will demand a tax invoice from its seller in or-
der to support its claimed input tax credit on purchases.275 Since
the buyer will claim the input tax credit, the government can
cross-match the buyer's input tax credits against the seller's re-
ported sales and uncover unreported sales. Notwithstanding their
faith in the tax invoice, European countries relying on VAT have
sustained significant revenue losses from evasion under their
VATs.276 While invoice matching may reduce evasion, the Europe-
ans found that civil servants administering VAT spend much of
their time verifying the timely filing of returns and reviewing tax-
payer claims for VAT refunds, leaving little time to match tax in-
277voices.  In addition, the buyer has no incentive to ensure that the
seller paid the tax listed on its invoice. It would be costly for tax
I" Id. at 91. To gather its data, the Service hired an independent survey firm, who guar-
anteed anonymity t6 those surveyed. The surveyor still had to interview consumers, not
vendors, and therefore gathered data on vendor noncompliance only indirectly. Id.
"I' See supra pp. 240-41.
276 See Pohmer, supra note 206, at 91. Italy reportedly has the most pervasive VAT eva-
sion, amounting to approximately 40% of national income accounts estimates. Id. at 36. In
Belgium, eight percent of VAT is evaded, even though it has an extensive computer match-
ing program for imports. In the Netherlands, based on 1976 field audits, it was reported that
34% of the audited businesses evaded tax, resulting in evasion of 1.2% of receipts. Id. at 87.
Some of the VAT evasion in Europe results from sellers issuing false invoices listing VAT,
but the seller does not report it as part of its output tax, yet the buyer claims the input tax
credit for the VAT reported on the invoice received. See Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep't.
of the Treasury, Value-Added Tax: European Experience and Lessons for the United States
60 (1980).
277 See Cnossen, The Netherlands, The Value Added Tax: Lessons from Europe, supra
note 83, at 51. Under its VAT, effective in 1986, the Republic of China adopted an ambi-
tious program to place tax invoice data in its VAT computer base. For business-to-business
sales, the seller must issue invoices with four copies. The seller sends one copy with its
report of output tax on sales and the buyer sends one copy to support its claimed input tax
credit. These two copies are entered into the computer and cross-matched. This program
applies to invoices for sales above some administratively-determined amount. It is too early
to judge the effectiveness (including cost considerations) of this program to minimize eva-
sion. The information about this program was obtained by the author from Ministry of
Finance personnel in Taiwan. Interview with Mr. Chieng Chin-Chan, Director, 1st Div.,
Dep't of Taxation, Ministry of Fin., Republic of China (August, 27 1987).
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administrators to cross-match all claimed input tax credits on in-
voices issued by one seller in one tax period against that seller's
reported output tax for that period.2 78
A substantial part of the individual income tax is withheld at the
source of the income through a withholding tax on wages. In con-
trast, while consumers of taxed items bear the VAT, it is collected
by the seller who, in turn, remits it to the government. It therefore
has been suggested that if Congress relied on taxes imposed both
at the source and the use of funds, individuals that evade tax at
the source of their income still would contribute to federal revenue
by paying VAT when they spend their income on personal con-
sumption items. However, if Congress enacted a VAT rather than
increasing revenue from the existing individual income tax, it is
unlikely that there would be any appreciable change in the level of
income and VAT compliance by informal vendors. Evasion by in-
formal vendors accounts for only a small proportion of income tax
evasion attributable to "cash-related informal arrangements."27
These vendors supply goods and services for cash, they service
predominantly private consumers, and they ordinarily do not have
to provide receipts or other documentation of their sales. They
probably would remain outside the income tax system and legally
may not be subject to the VAT system if their sales do not exceed
the minimum annual turnover required for inclusion in the system.
The informal vendors that would be subject to VAT, but that fail
to report their sales for income tax purposes, likely would extend
their noncompliance to VAT. Some VAT revenue may be collected
from this sector because these vendors will pay VAT on their busi-
ness purchases that are subject to VAT. In addition, they will pay
VAT on their purchases of personal consumption items. Even if
VAT were collectible from these informal vendors who currently
evade the income tax, this benefit alone would not justify the
adoption of a new tax with its attendant tax administration and
taxpayer compliance costs.
""' See Hemming & Kay, The United Kingdom, in Value Added Tax: Lessons from Eu-
rope, supra note 83, at 87. For this reason, in the United Kingdom, "compliance is imposed
by random checks of accounting procedures." Id.
"Cash-related informal arrangements" include informal sales to households, moon-
lighting, and gross receipts skimming, collectively commonly known as sales "on the side."
See Estimates of Income Unreported, supra note 260, at 118-19.
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4. Tax Administrative Costs Under an Income Tax and VATP80
The United States spends, as a percentage of tax collections, less
than most countries on the administration of the federal tax laws.
In fact, this cost has varied remarkably little over the past few de-
cades, and it has not increased when the tax laws became more
complex or the number of taxpayers increased. During this period,
it has ranged between 0.38% and 0.56% of tax collections.28 The
Service does not publish a breakdown of administrative costs by
type of tax, so it is difficult to compare American costs to collect
income taxes with those of other nations. Nevertheless, since our
overall costs are dramatically less than those in European coun-
tries, it is reasonable to assume that our cost to administer the
federal income taxes is less than the reported costs to administer
income taxes abroad.
The administrative costs to collect a multistage VAT is much
higher than a single stage sales tax levied at the manufacturing,
wholesale or retail level. For example, the United Kingdom re-
placed its wholesale level purchase tax282 with a broad-based multi-
stage VAT. The purchase tax included 75,000 collection points and
was administered by 1,600-1,700 civil servants. In contrast, the
VAT had 1.25 million collection points and was administered by
11,000 civil servants.2 3 The tax administrative costs (as well as
taxpayer compliance costs) under the European VATs seem to de-
pend "on whether businesses are accustomed to keeping good writ-
ten records and on the shares of activity carried out by small busi-
nesses." 284 There is a basic threshold cost to organize a staff to
administer a federal VAT. In the United Kingdom, during the
early years with its new VAT, the administrative costs were about
"" "Tax administrative costs ... are the costs incurred by the revenue authorities in the
taxation process." C. Sandford, M. Goodwin, E. Hardwick & M. Butterworth, Costs and
Benefits of VAT 13 (1981) [hereinafter Costs and Benefits].
", 1984 Commissioner & Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Ann. Rep. 71, Table 22.
22 The United Kingdom also replaced its selective employment tax with the VAT. The
selective employment tax, introduced in September, 1966, was designed to encourage the
redistribution of labor into manufacturing and to support regional development policy. It
taxed selected services, such as hotels and restaurants. See National Economic Dev. Office
(United Kingdom), Value Added Tax 21, 29 & 110-11 (1971) [hereinafter United Kingdom
Report].
28. See A. Prest, supra note 174, at 13.
284 See Pohmer, supra note 206, at 8.
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two percent of VAT collections,285 but when rates increased in
1979, the administrative costs declined to 1.25% of tax collections.
Administrative costs do increase as the number of preferences
granted under the VAT scheme increase.28 With only a single pos-
itive rate, the early British VAT system was costly to administer
because it included many categories of exempt and zero-rated
items. Commentators have argued and the European experience
has confirmed that the cost to administer a VAT is higher if the
VAT is imposed at multiple positive rates.287 In some cases, the
estimates of the added burden have been exaggerated. For exam-
ple, before the adoption of the British VAT, it was estimated that
the use of multiple tax rates rather than a single tax rate could
increase administrative costs between fifty and eighty percent.288
In fact, the switch from a single to multiple positive rates necessi-
tated only a ten percent increase in staff.289 In part, this small in-
crease may have been attributable to the fact that the United
Kingdom already employed a large number of civil servants to ad-
minister the single positive rate system that included exemptions
and zero rating on a large number of consumer items. The cost to
administer an American VAT would depend upon the scope of the
tax, the number of taxpayers, the length of the tax periods, the
number of tax rates, and the extent of tax preferences granted.
Treasury, as part of its 1984 report to the President on tax re-
form, examined the possible adoption of a federal VAT. Treasury
estimated that, when a broad-based VAT was fully implemented,
it would require over 20,000 staffing positions and would cost an
estimated $700 million to administer.290 In England, when Parlia-
285 See Hemming & Kay, supra note 278, at 86.
288 The Customs and Excise Department claimed that it was costly to administer the tax
refund procedure for 30% of registered traders that received VAT refunds. If the number of
zero rated items were reduced, those costs would decline. See A. Prest, supra note 174, at 36.
:87 See United Kingdom Report, supra note 282, at 41.
288 See id.
289 See 890 Parl. Deb., H.C., (5th Ser.) 304 (1975). Nevertheless, the introduction of mul-
tiple rates created complex line drawing problems. For example, it became necessary to dis-
tinguish between a wedding ring, taxed as jewelry at a higher rate, from a bishop's ring
taxed at the standard rate. See A. Prest, supra note 174, at 30.
29 3 Treasury Proposal, supra note 1 , at 124, app. at 9-B. Treasury estimated that there
would be 20 million VAT taxpayers filing quarterly returns. Id. at 113. In contrast, in 1984,
there were 5.5 million firms registered under the state retail sales taxes. While the estimate
of 1988 total personal consumption expenditures was $3,127 billion, a more realistic compre-
hensive base may be $2,408 billion, producing $24 billion in revenue for each percentage
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ment adopted VAT, it added a new tax tribunal solely to handle
VAT disputes.2 91 The above Treasury estimates of the cost of
adopting a federal VAT did not include any costs to the Justice
Department for district court or appellate litigation or costs for ex-
isting or new courts to handle the additional cases. Therefore, the
total cost to implement an American VAT would be even higher.
If VAT were enacted, the new structure needed to administer
the tax would increase the total cost (as well as the cost as a per-
centage of revenue) to administer the federal taxes. Using Trea-
sury's cost estimates, if Congress adopted a five percent VAT that
raised $100 billion in revenue, the administrative cost would be at
least 0.7% of revenue. The actual total costs are likely to be
higher. In contrast, it would cost only marginally more than the
current tax administrative costs to raise an additional $100 billion
from existing federal income and payroll taxes. In addition, even if
the adoption of VAT permitted Congress to reduce income and
payroll tax revenue, it is unlikely that the latter tax cuts would
result in any meaningful reduction in the Service's costs to admin-
ister the income and payroll taxes.
Even if the United States adopted a broad-based VAT with no
preferences linked to the nature of the goods sold or services ren-
dered, the statute would raise line drawing problems that would
increase the tax administrative costs (as well as taxpayer compli-
ance costs). For example, normal jurisdictional rules under a desti-
nation principle VAT create interpretative problems. If the VAT is
rebated only on exports of goods and imposed only on imports of
goods, but not services, it is necessary to distinguish between goods
and services. Even in countries that define these terms in excruci-
ating detail, there are disputes about the differences between
goods and services that ultimately must be resolved by the courts
or the legislature.
Under VAT statutes, the legislatures generally provide some
preferences based on the nature of the goods sold or services ren-
dered. In close cases, sellers take aggressive tax positions and claim
point of VAT. Id. at 85-86. Treasury did not base its estimated administrative cost of $700
million on a predetermined VAT rate or estimate of VAT revenue. Id. at 113.
"' The VAT Tribunals were created "to provide an inexpensive method of making an
appeal and to prevent clogging the courts with unnecessary detail. A. Prest, supra note 174,
at 27.
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that their goods or services come within the granted exemption or
zero-rate. This tension breeds litigation. For example, some indus-
tries, such as housing and financial intermediaries, present intrac-
table tax base problems. Because of political concerns and admin-
istrative problems relating to the taxation of housing, and due to
difficulty defining value added by insurance companies, banks and
other financial intermediaries, legislatures have often exempted
from VAT, housing and transactions by financial intermediaries.
However, on the fringes, there are disputes as to whether particu-
lar goods or services come within these preferences.
5. Taxpayer Compliance Costs Under an Income Tax and
VAT 92
Taxpayers are accustomed to filing individual and corporate in-
come tax returns based on annual accounts and maintaining the
required business records. In addition, in most states, retailers
maintain records and file returns required under state retail sales
taxes. Even small retailers comply with the sales tax laws. While
the retail sales tax bases (with limited categories of taxable ser-
vices) are narrower than the typical VAT, it is likely that the level
of compliance with a VAT would be comparable.
It is difficult to estimate the cost for taxpayers to comply with a
federal VAT, but since the compliance demands tend to be most
onerous for small businesses, compliance costs likely are distrib-
uted regressively as to income.2 9 When the European nations en-
acted VATs, many small businesses with manual accounting found
it necessary to revise their invoice forms and mechanize their ac-
counting procedures by purchasing automated cash registers or
bookkeeping machines.294 Soon after Germany switched from its
turnover tax to VAT, according to a survey of German businesses,
292 "Tax compliance costs. . . may be defined as the costs which are incurred by taxpay-
ers or by third parties in meeting the requirements of the tax system, over and above the
tax liability itself and over and above any harmful distortions of consumption or production
to which the tax may give rise." Costs and Benefits, supra note 280, at 13. Unlike adminis-
trative costs, which can be borne out of revenue and shared by all taxpayers, compliance
costs are borne by individual taxpayers and tend to vary, depending upon the nature and
size of the taxpayer and other factors. See id. at 14.
293 Pohmer, supra note 206, at 51-52. For a detailed British study of compliance costs, see
Costs and Benefits, supra note 280, at 13-25.
294 United Kingdom Report, supra note 282, at 41.
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the administrative costs to comply with the new consumption tax
were five to twenty percent higher than the costs under the turno-
ver tax.29 5 However, the survey was taken durink the transition pe-
riod, and it may overstate the actual long-term increase in costs
associated with the new VAT.29 Under the British invoice method
VAT, taxpayer complaints about the VAT system tend to be "in
the nature of special interest pleading or general grumbling
[rather] than attacks on the concept of the tax. '2 97
Taxpayer compliance costs depend upon the number of returns
that must be submitted annually, the amount of information re-
quired on these returns, and the complexity of the tax. A federal
VAT would not replace other federal taxes. Even if it were coupled
with significant simplification of existing taxes levied on business,
the total cost for business to comply with federal taxes would in-
crease. With a VAT riddled with preferences, the taxpayer compli-
ance costs would increase substantially. It would be necessary for
businesses to define and segregate high from low or zero-rated
sales, segregate taxable from exempt sales, and segregate purchases
attributable to taxable and exempt sales.
6. Summary
To date, taxpayers view sales taxes as among the least offensive
taxes, but their positive attitude toward sales taxes may result
from the fact that they pay less state and local sales tax than most
other major forms of tax levied at all three levels of government. It
is uncertain whether taxpayers would favor a federal sales tax over
the other major federal taxes, especially if the sales tax were im-
posed at a high rate.
The adoption of a federal VAT will require the establishment of
the administrative apparatus and the training of VAT agents and
other personnel. It therefore is costly (as a percentage of revenue)
to enact a VAT, unless it raises a level of revenue that would jus-
tify the added government administrative costs.
Sales taxes constitute a significant revenue source in almost
every state. Retailers therefore are familiar with sales tax reporting
and recordkeeping requirements. Except for an adjustment needed
295 Id.
'" Id. at 41.
"9 Id. at 39.
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to account for input tax on purchases (a critical element in a
VAT), retailers within the sales tax regimes may find that they do
not have to incur significant additional costs to comply with a
broad-based VAT with minimal preferences. However, except for
those businesses subject to federal excise taxes, manufacturers and'
other traders above the retail stage and providers of most services
at retail do not have experience with sales taxes. They will incur
additional costs to comply with a broad-based VAT. Finally, for all
businesses, compliance costs would jump if Congress adopted a
complex VAT with multiple rates and many preferences.
With a federal VAT, the public may perceive that individuals
and businesses that cheat under the income taxes will be contrib-
uting to the federal revenue by paying VAT. However, while these
income tax evaders in the business sector may bear VAT on their
business purchases, they typically underreport their sales for in-
come tax purposes and may extend this evasion by underreporting
sales (output tax) for VAT purposes.
The addition of a federal VAT (without a corresponding increase
in government spending) should permit a reduction in the deficit
and the maintenance of the lower income tax rates enacted in
1986. With low income and VAT rates, Congress may reduce the
level of evasion of federal taxes and thereby promote public confi-
dence in the federal tax system.
The sales invoice under the European-style VAT provides an au-
dit trail for government auditors to match the seller's output tax
liability and the buyer's input tax credits. In practice, most of the
foreign countries have not been able to devote the resources neces-
sary to cross-match these invoices. While the European countries
claimed that the invoice made VAT a self-policing tax, they have
experienced significant VAT evasion.
Before Congress considers the adoption of a new VAT as a
means to increase the overall level of taxpayer compliance, it
should consider the imposition of withholding of income tax on in-
terest and dividends, the withholding of tax on business payments
to independent contractors providing services, and an increase in
the Service's taxpayer compliance budget. 9 8
298 See Estimates of Income Unreported, supra note 260, at iv & 8.
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F. Federal-State Fiscal Relations
A major source of state tax revenue is the retail sales tax.299 En-
actment of a federal VAT may not alter the states' ability to main-
tain or increase their sales or other taxes.s0  There may be some
correlation between the level of federal taxes (as a percentage of
GNP) and the states' ability to increase their tax revenue,"' but it
is less likely that the composition of the federal tax system has any
direct bearing on the states' tax-raising capacity. 02 For example,
the federal government's adoption of significant excise taxes (selec-
tive sales taxes) during World War II did not hinder the states'
ability to raise revenue from the retail sales tax. 3 States still may
view the enactment of a federal VAT as an intrusion into their
sales tax jurisdiction. The level of state opposition may depend
upon the kind of VAT adopted. States may oppose the adoption of
the European-style VAT, a transactional form of consumption tax,
but may not resist an annual tax on value added, such as Senator
Roth's BTT,30 especially if the latter is perceived as a tax borne
by business rather than by consumers.
The state attitude toward a federal transactions form of VAT
also may vary, depending in part on what programs the new reve-
nue will finance. A state may favor a VAT to finance national
health or welfare reform if the new federal programs will replace
state-financed programs. States currently differ in their levels of
concentration of poor people and in their levels of support for wel-
fare and health care for the nonworking poor. As a group, the in-
dustrial states can be expected to be more supportive of a new
VAT to be used to fund federal programs that reduce disparities in
taxation among the states because, in part, these disparities may
encourage the migration of their businesses to low-tax states.
If VAT is used as a revenue supplement to fund the deficit or
existing federal programs, the states may be less supportive or may
299 See J. Due & J. Mikesell, supra note 43, at 1.
30 Some states cannot increase their sales taxes above their current levels. For example,
Michigan already imposes sales tax at the maximum rate permissible under its constitution.
See Mich. Const. of 1963, Art. 9, § 8 (1974).
301 See Policy Considerations, supra note 181, at 73.
302 Id.
303 Tax Foundation, Facts & Figures on Government Finance, 16 Biennial Report 139
(1971).
304 See supra note 54.
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oppose the new tax because they may believe that the new tax will
hinder their ability to maintain or increase their sales tax revenue.
Although states may also be opposed to a VAT used to reduce
other federal taxes, they may nevertheless support such a tax if it
is revenue neutral.
A state's attitude toward a federal VAT also may be influenced
by the extent to which the state relies on sales taxes for state reve-
nue. Connecticut, with a 7.5% sales tax, and New York (especially
with pressure from New York City, that has a combined state-city
eight percent rate), may be more opposed to a federal VAT than
Georgia or North Carolina, that have three percent sales taxes or
New Hampshire, which does not impose a sales tax at all.30 5
If the federal government enacts a VAT, it could grant states the
option to piggyback on the federal tax, using the federal collection
machinery instead of the state's own sales tax staff3 6 Alterna-
tively, a state could enact a multistage VAT and piggyback on the
federal VAT, or if it prefers to limit its sales tax to the retail level,
it might piggyback only on retail sales. Over the long term, the
piggyback option could lead to uniform state sales taxes. No doubt,
some states may view a proposal for piggybacking as a more seri-
ous infringement on state sovereignty or state fiscal independence
than the adoption of a federal VAT itself. To obtain the full bene-
fit of piggybacking, states would have to relinquish their power to
define the tax base, tax terms, and penalties. 7
300 See Table of Rates, 2 State Tax Guide (CCH) 60-000, at 6021. The eight percent
combined New York City and state rate does not include a '/4 of one percent transit district
tax. See 2 New York St. Tax Rep (CCH) 60-416.
'" On the possibility and desirability of piggy backing a state VAT on the federal VAT,
see Special Comm. on the Value-Added Tax of the Section of Tax'n, ABA, The Choice
Between Value-Added and Sales Taxation at Federal and State Levels in the United States,
29 Tax Law 457, 470-73 (1976)[hereinafter Value-Added and Sales Taxation]. See also Pol-
icy Considerations, supra note 181, at 73 (outlining the difficulties encountered in piggy-
backing state tax upon federal tax).
30. There are many technical hurdles that must be overcome before a state could piggy-
back their sales tax onto a federal VAT, not the least of which is state acceptance of the
federal definition of a taxable sale. If a federal VAT operates alongside state retail sales
taxes, Congress must decide whether the state sales taxes are includable in the VAT base,
and the states must decide if the VAT is includable in the retail sales tax bases. See Value-
Added and Sales Taxation, supra note 306, at 470-73.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article critically examines the question of whether there are
policy reasons why Congress should enact a federal VAT. For pur-
poses of this analysis, it is assumed that the federal VAT will be a
multistage, transactions form of consumption tax. It will incorpo-
rate the European C-style, invoice method applied on a destination
principle. The VAT will be collected by sellers, but intended to be
shifted forward and be borne by consumers. Further, it is assumed
that the tax base will include PCEs as well as government
purchases.
Before the 1986 reforms, Congress and the President may have
obtained public support for a program that coupled the enactment
of a new VAT with structural reforms (including tax cuts) in the
existing federal taxes. However, after the two year tax reform de-
bate culminating in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, except for the
acknowledged need for corporate reforms, 308 it is unlikely that even
the temptation of a new revenue source would prompt Congress to
revisit basic reform of existing taxes in the near future. It is more
likely that Congress would consider increasing tax revenue with ex-
isting federal income taxes or a VAT to finance the deficit or new
programs.
If Congress decides to raise additional revenue, and wants to use
standards of individual or family income or family status to dis-
tribute the tax burden, it is more appropriate to rely on an annual
income or expenditure tax that can be tailored to individual cir-
cumstances than to rely on a transactions form of consumption
tax, a VAT. In other words, if Congress wants to achieve distribu-
tional goals as part of a revenue-raising effort, it should rely on
existing income taxes rather than on a VAT, an inherently inferior
vehicle to achieve such goals. If, however, Congress decides to alter
the federal tax base and distribute part of the tax burden among
consumers in proportion to what they take out of our community
resources in the form of consumption of taxable goods and ser-
vices, then a VAT designed to be shifted to consumers is appropri-
ate. In part, it would represent a shift of part of the federal tax
burden from an income tax imposed on a base that represents the
IS See Staff of the Senate Fin. Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess., The Subchapter C Revision
Act of 1985, A Final Report Prepared by the Staff for Submission to the Committee on
Finance 73 (1985).
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potential power to consume to a consumption tax imposed on a
base that represents the exercise of that power through purchases
of consumption items.
A federal VAT could significantly change the federal tax base,
and, for this reason, could form the basis for a reexamination of
the present array of federal taxes. The federal government relies
on direct taxes on income (income and payroll taxes) for most of
the national revenue. In 1982, they accounted for 80.8% of all fed-
eral taxes. Most of the income and payroll taxes are withheld at
the source of the income. About eighty-four percent of the individ-
ual income tax base and all of the payroll tax bases consist of labor
income. Thus, one incentive to add a federal consumption tax is to
shift part of the tax burden from the source of the income to the
use of after-tax income for consumption. Only selective excise
taxes are imposed on the sale of goods and services. While consum-
ers in states with retail sales taxes bear tax imposed on goods and
some services subject to the sales tax, units of government and in-
come tax-exempt organizations generally do not bear sales taxes on
their purchases. Thus, considering the federal level alone or com-
bining tax imposed at all levels of government, the tax burden on
consumer goods and services is distributed unevenly, creating eco-
nomic inefficiency by encouraging the purchase of untaxed or low
taxed items and discouraging the purchase of high taxed items. Es-
pecially with the expansion of the service sector of the American
economy, a federal VAT would expand the federal tax base by in-
cluding consumption of goods as well as the relatively untaxed con-
sumption of services. A federal VAT also could raise revenue from
sales to the significant charitable-governmental sectors of the econ-
omy. Except for the tax on unrelated business income, the charita-
ble sector basically has escaped the income, property, and con-
sumption tax bases at all levels of government. If it were desirable
to have them contribute to the federal revenue, Congress may find
it easier to impose a VAT on purchases and some sales by units of
government and income tax-exempt organizations. As the popula-
tion ages and the proportion of retirees to workers increases, the
payroll tax and to some extent the income tax base may decline. If
it is desirable to impose federal tax both on the earning of income
during the working years and on the use of savings for consump-
tion during the retirement years, a federal VAT may be used to
achieve this goal. It is questionable whether the enactment of a
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destination-principle VAT would improve our balance of trade.
While the VAT likely will zero-rate exports and tax imports of
goods, this VAT jurisdictional rule cannot be expected to increase
exports in the long term, especially if the currency markets will
correct for significant trade imbalances. A federal VAT may serve
to increase the federal taxes levied on imports. Currently, imports
contribute to federal revenue only to the extent that customs du-
ties are imposed on imported goods and some imported services. A
VAT can tax value that has been added to goods and services
outside the United States.
During the post World War II period, the federal government
has increased its reliance on payroll taxes, reduced its reliance on
corporate taxes, and raised about the same proportion of revenue
from the individual income tax. The United States does not rely as
heavily as most of our trading partners do on consumption taxes.
Also, most of the Western industrialized countries take a larger
percentage of their gross national product in taxes. It is not appar-
ent that, for competitive reasons, we should follow their example
and rely more heavily on VAT or other forms of federal consump-
tion tax.
On balance economic factors do not favor the adoption of a fed-
eral VAT, since Congress could raise revenue from existing income
taxes. It is unlikely that taxes, per se, significantly influence the
inflation rate, and, to the extent that they do, it is likely that VAT
will increase prices and wages more than hikes in income and pay-
roll taxes. VAT taxes consumption and not savings and therefore
should encourage savings more than income taxes levied on returns
on savings. However, in the early 1980s, Congress enacted savings
incentives under the income tax and they did not stimulate signifi-
cant capital formation. Consequently, while reliance on VAT
should encourage savings and capital formation more than reliance
on income and payroll taxes, there is conflicting evidence as to
whether adoption of a federal VAT will have any positive long-
term effect on economic growth.
On equity grounds, a VAT may not fare well. If it is desirable to
tailor an individual or family unit's tax burden to individual in-
come or other factors, the individual income tax is better suited to
the task. Congress has relied on progressive federal taxes to
achieve vertical equity in the federal system, but in light of the
1986 reform that cut the top rate and reduced the number of rate
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brackets under the individual income tax, it is not clear that Con-
gress or the taxpaying public continues to regard progressive taxes
as an essential component of the federal tax system. Thus, while
VAT is regressive as to income. (measured over a year rather than a
lifetime), if our collective judgment on the concept of vertical eq-
uity and the desirable distribution of the federal tax burden is rep-
resented by the 1986 Code, then a broad-based VAT may not be
viewed as creating a more inequitable federal tax structure. Also, if
Congress favored VAT but wanted to offset the regressivity of this
sales tax, it could achieve its distributional goals by granting cred-
its under the income tax or increasing benefits under direct grant
programs for the poor. Measured by standards of neutrality or eco-
nomic efficiency, a broad-based VAT scores well. However, if the
late Chairman Al Ullman's proposed VAT foretells the kind of
VAT Congress would be likely to adopt, an American VAT would
include tax preferences and thus would not be neutral as to choices
among consumer items.
VAT can be used as a fiscal tool to fine tune the economy by
affecting the overall level of consumption of all or selected goods
and services (altering the overall rate versus imposing preferential
or higher rates on selected items). With the Congressional effort,
as part of the 1986 reforms, to eliminate many of the income tax
incentives previously used to achieve economic or social goals, it
would be inconsistent for Congress now to favor VAT because of
this characteristic. There are nonfiscal tools, such as the Federal
Reserve's control over the money supply, that the government can
use to regulate excessive swings in the business cycle.
For a variety of reasons, individuals tend to favor sales taxes
over the federal income tax. Part of the appeal of sales taxes may
be the public perception that all consumers must bear sales taxes,
while some taxpayers avoid the full impact of the income tax
through artful tax planning. Taxpayer compliance may be greater
if tax collection is split between taxes imposed at the point of use
of income for consumption as well as at the source of the income,
especially if the new revenue source permits Congress to raise the
required revenue by imposing low rates for all federal taxes. This
kind of tax structure minimizes the level of tax-motivated transac-
tions that occur when marginal tax rates are high. However, even if
the level of compliance does not increase significantly, if the new
balance among federal taxes is perceived as a system in which most
1987]
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taxpayers pay a fair share of the tax burden, the public will have
more confidence in the overall federal tax system. This public con-
fidence may foster taxpayer compliance.
The enactment of a federal VAT will increase costs both for the
government to administer and for taxpayers to comply with federal
tax requirements. Indeed, given the costs of hiring a staff within
the Treasury and Justice Departments to administer the tax as
well as the costs incurred by taxpayers in hiring and training em-
ployees to comply with a broad-based VAT, a strong argument can
be made to rely on existing taxes to raise additional federal reve-
nue. As a percentage of revenue generated, the cost for the govern-
ment to establish and maintain a structure to administer a low rate
VAT (five percent range) likely will be much higher than the cost
to administer higher rate income and payroll taxes, especially if
the VAT provides preferences for certain consumer goods and ser-
vices. This cost, as a percentage of revenue, will decline if the tax
rate and VAT revenue is increased. A VAT will impose a more on-
erous burden on small businesses than on large corporations, espe-
cially if the former do not rely on automated accounting systems.
It is not clear if the adoption of a low rate federal sales tax
would adversely affect the states' ability to raise more (or possibly
the same level of) revenue from state sales taxes. The impact of a
federal VAT on state revenue raising capacity may be affected
more by the combined federal, state, and local sales tax rate. If this
rate is high, taxpayers may pressure their representatives at all
levels of government to reduce the tax on consumption. This pres-
sure may increase if the VAT is used to materially increase the
level of federal tax as a percentage of GNP.
Still, focusing on the above positive and negative attributes of a
VAT tends to shift the analysis away from the basic issue of
whether Congress should adopt a broad-based federal consumption
tax. In part, the answer depends upon what level of taxation we
collectively are willing to impose upon ourselves to improve the na-
tional standard of living, and how we decide to allocate that bur-
den among taxpayers. In large part, a consensus on the acceptable
overall level of taxation depends upon what existing, new or ex-
panded government services are popular enough to merit public fi-
nance. If Congress decides to increase total federal revenue, ulti-
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mately, the mixture of federal taxes and the allocation of the fed-
eral tax burden must reflect the shared values of taxpayers as to
what is "fair."

